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International Seaborne Piracy and the State:  
Lessons to be learned from History? 
ABSTRACT 
Since 1994 worldwide maritime piracy has witnessed an explosion. While data collec-
tion has improved, the incidence of piracy has undoubtedly risen as well, particularly in 
areas of the world marked by `failed' or 'weak' states’ (Somalia, Papua New Guinea, 
Sierra Leone), though some areas (South-East Asia) have experienced piracy as a per-
ennial hazard. It is not clear whether modern nation states are sufficiently equipped to 
deal with such a problem, and it is from within international bodies that we might best 
expect the lead to be taken against the current piracy epidemic (NATO/UN/EU). How-
ever, while the EuNavfor Atalanta taskforce can already boast of some early successes, 
there are also substantial legal hurdles to be overcome in resurrecting piracy laws un-
used in 400 years, as some test cases like that of MS Taipan, which got underway in the 
Hamburg Amtsgericht in October 2010, demonstrate. As a historian, one should ask 
how the problem of seaborne piracy was addressed and suppressed by European powers 
in the past, for example in the period 1480-1725 in which I am specifically interested. 
Means of enforcing stricter penalties, increasing naval patrols of sea lanes, and shifting 
official attitudes regarding the threat posed by piracy to the well-being of nation 
states, are all lessons policy-makers today would do well to take heed of. Not all at-
tempts at resolving piracy were successful, and in what follows tree different case stud-
ies shall be presented: the piratic attacks by the so-called ‘Victualian Brothers’ against 
the Wendish cities of the Hanseatic League over the last fifteen years of the fourteenth 
century, a relatively small-scale challenge which had a wider international backdrop, 
but which was successfully extirpated; then, the case of Portugal in the sixteenth centu-
ry, where piracy threatened simultaneously on too many fronts, and was not successful-
ly swept aside; and the case of Britain in the eighteenth, where piracy again presented 
itself as a global problem, but efforts to counter it were more far-ranging, handled by a 
specially commissioned sub-state agency, sanctioned with new purposeful legislation, 
and where the fight was met with greater success. 
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International Seaborne Piracy and the State:  
Lessons to be learned from History?  
INTRODUCTION 
Worldwide maritime piracy was defined by the UN convention on the law of the sea in 
1982 as ‘any criminal acts of violence, detention, rape or depredation committed by a 
private party onboard one ship against another ship on the high seas’.1 Recent criminal 
law would seem if anything to be more demanding in its application of this term: last 
year, Attorney Neil MacBride for the US federal courts in the eastern district of Virginia 
explained that ‘piracy involves armed hijacking on the high seas with a very real threat 
of death to those taken hostage´, although the MS Nicholas and Ashland trials in 2010 
saw 30-year sentences handed down even though neither vessel was actually boarded, 
shots simply were fired and some material damage inflicted.2 At any rate, since 1994 
piracy has witnessed an explosion globally, according to the International Maritime Or-
ganization database. More than four hundred separate attacks on cargo ships have been 
registered in the 2000s.3 While data collection has certainly improved with, for example, 
the establishment of the Piracy Reporting Centre (PRO) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 
1992, the incidence of piracy as a worldwide phenomenon has undoubtedly risen as 
well, particularly in areas of the world such as Somalia, marked by the collapse of the 
Socialist dictatorship of Siad Barre in 1991. While ‘failed states’ such as Somalia have 
seen the proliferation of piracy, ‘weak states’ like Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone 
have also seen a rapid rise in piracy. Some areas, such as South-East Asia have perenni-
ally attracted piracy from earliest times, which specialists have ascribed to the frag-
mented geography and plethora of riverine estuaries and offshore islands.4 
With the high profile seizure of the Ukrainian cargo vessel MV Faina in August 
2008, which contained as many as 33 armed tanks destined for covert Kenyan military 
activities in southern Sudan, maritime piracy has hit the world headlines, with national 
governments discussing amongst themselves how best to protect important international 
                                                 
1  www.un.org/depts/05/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm. 
2  Reported in BBC News on 3 October 2011. 
3  V. Kotlyar, ‘Piracy in the 21st century’, in International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy 
and International Relations, 2009, vol. 55, issue 3, 59-67. 
4  See, for example, the relevant clauses in the Maritime Law of Malacca, written between 1488-1511 (Undang-
undang Laut; dan Undang-undang laut, ed. Hasan Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Karyawan, 2003), or ethnog-
raphies of ‘piratic’ peoples like the Maghs, in Amiran Gonen ed., The Encyclopedia of Peoples of the World, New 
York: Henry Holt, 1993. 
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shipping lanes such as those that pass the Horn of Africa. The stakes are high indeed: of 
all world merchandise trade, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has estimated that 
75% of it travels by sea as a proportion of value. In terms of weight, the figure is more 
like 90%. 
Organisations within the United States were perhaps first to respond. The US coast-
guard has been instrumental in the past few years in establishing instruments such as 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), a surveillance program of seaborne activities and 
intelligence gathering.  The data collected from different sources is to be ‘fused’ here 
into a common format. Another US initiative is the so-called ‘Global Maritime Partner-
ship’ elucidated at the 17th International Seapower Symposium in Rhode Island in 2005, 
a call for other national merchant navies and shipping companies to work together to 
promote global maritime security via information-sharing. The US is also responsible 
for the dispatch of the USS Dwight Eisenhower task force to the troubled region. 
Initially, it was not clear whether nation states are today sufficiently equipped to deal 
with such problems, and it is from within international bodies that we might best expect 
the lead to be taken against the current piracy epidemic. International organizations such 
as NATO announced their intention to intervene, sending off a Standing Naval Mari-
time Group 2 under Durand de la Penne, and setting up a logistical command centre for 
anti-piracy operations in Northwood, Middlesex, while Russia has called upon the UN 
to broker a solution. In fact, the UN Security Council has already approved the armed 
intervention against pirates. Another international actor has been the EU, which on 2 
October 2008 agreed to establish an anti-piracy security operation off Somalia, opera-
tional from November 2008, called Operation Atalanta EUNavfor. Task forces were 
created within this operation, for example, to protect vessels of the World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP) and vessels of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as 
well as protecting vulnerable vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, and moni-
toring fishing activities. The most recent missions have, following EU authorization, 
switched gear so as to destroy pirate bases on land.5 
The Atalanta search force has already been praised with success in that while the 
overall number of piratic attacks has escalated, a smaller proportion of those attacks has 
been successful.6 Other voices remind us that the current crop of pirates are working 
alone, and not in cahoots with other rogue governments, or western renegades, and that 
it is a localized problem (they do not descend on vulnerable ports in the West as was the 
                                                 
5  Reported in BBC News 15 May, 2012. 
6  See the relevant statistics at http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures/ (URL accessed 24 January 2013) 
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case throughout the early modern age).7 But it is too early to consider this a problem 
resolved. 
THE DEVELOPING SEARCH FOR LEGAL TOOLS TO PROSECUTE PIRATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE OF MS TAIPAN. 
‘Hostis humani generis’, an enemy to mankind, is the historical legal categorization of 
this crime, one which have seen pirates subject to universal condemnation, a bit like 
perpetrators of genocide. But time and again, it has proved difficult to try pirates for 
their transgressions of human morality if only because privateers did much the same 
albeit with the sanction of the ruling authorities. Thus, it has proved easier to bring pi-
rates to trial for their failure to comply with the formalities of licensing. That the resur-
gence of piracy in the 1990s took British criminal codes by surprise is an understate-
ment; piracy remained a capital offence until 1998, when it was finally taken off under 
Section 3 of the Crime and Disorder Act. The same is true in other European countries, 
as the details of the MS Taipan case illustrate.  
At the beginning of April 2010, five hundred nautical miles off the coast of Somalia, 
a gang of Somalians attacked the container ship ‘Taipan’. On Easter Monday the crew – 
which had barricaded itself inside the ship at arms length from their attackers - was lib-
erated after four hours of captivity by a Dutch marine commando unit, and the attackers 
seized. Fortunately, there were no fatalities, nor injuries sustained. 
The Hamburg District Court (Amtsgericht) immediately issued an instruction to im-
prison (Haftbefehle) the Somalians guilty of piracy. The men were consequently flow 
under arrest back to Europe. In mid-August, the law courts in Amsterdam decided to 
hand the men over to the Hamburger Staatsanwaltschaft despite the arguments of the 
defence that the trial should be held against the Somalians in the Netherlands. The de-
fence argued against sending the men to Germany on the basis that the ship was sailing 
under the flag of the Bahamas or Liberia rather than the German. In her concluding 
statements, Judge Hans Davids said that the German justice system had demonstrated its 
responsibility and competence (Zuständigkeit) for the case, and that the accused could 
be guaranteed a fair trial in German courts. 
In Hamburg, the ten men’s trial got under way in October 2010. The decision was 
made to try them under German penal codes rather than maritime law, and in public 
despite a plea made by the Defence to exclude media attention. Presiding Judge Bernd 
Steinmetz explained his decision in terms of the lively ongoing public discussion sur-
rounding ‘national and international piracy’. According to the Staatsanwaltschaft ‘satis-
                                                 
7  Adrian Tinniswood, Corsairs, Conquests, and Captivity in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean, Riverhead 
Books, 2010. 
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factory evidence’ (ausreichend Beweismittel) was shipped home including five ma-
chine-guns of the type Kalashnikow AK47, two rocket launchers, large quantities of 
ammunition and two middlemen (Enterleitern). Twenty-two witnesses (Zeugen) were 
persuaded to come forward and testify by the Staatsanwaltschaft. The charge was ini-
tially ‘versuchter erpresserischer Menschenraub und Angriff auf den Seeverkehr’, for 
which their punishment was to reach a ceiling of 15 years. But in the ensuing discus-
sions over the length of the applicable Haftbefehle, the Staatsanwaltschaft charge has 
changed somewhat so as to contest early release of the prisoners. It speaks now of ‘ver-
suchten gemeinschaftlichen Mordes’. 
Other negotiations include the fate of one of the accused, who is only a child of thir-
teen years of age and has not arrived at the age of criminal responsibility, i.e. is not yet 
strafmündig. He is to appear instead before the Jugendhaftrichter, where he made no 
statement.  The age of the other defendants also has to be established by the court. In 
America, the defendant Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse raised similar problems. While his 
defence lawyers insist he was born only in November 1993, prosecutors say he is over 
18.8 
In terms of wider context, the press has been quick to proclaim that this is the ‘first 
pirate trial in Hamburg for 400 years’, while others like to go back further still, citing 
Klaus Störtebeker, the leader and the best known representative of a companionship of 
privateers known as the Vitalian Brothers (Vitalienbrüder), and who operated between 
1360-1400. In England, pirate trials have been much more recent, and in certain parts of 
the world like southern China and Indonesia are ongoing. But the strongest parallels are 
to similar piracy trials going on in the US, where sentences have already been handed 
down. These concern the pirate attacks on the MS Nicholas and MS Ashland, two sepa-
rate incidents that were tried in Norfolk Virginia in November 2010.9 The Somali pi-
rates were encouraged to enter a guilty plea to the crime of ‘attacking to plunder a ves-
sel and engaging in an act of violence against people on a vessel’. The sentence was 
harsh: the pirates had to agree to a thirty year prison sentence. In the case of the attack 
on the yacht Quest, where four American sailors were killed, the Somalis sentenced 
were handed down life sentences, with a possible death penalty.10 
Some voices, like that of Annette Weber (NDR Fernsehen), proclaim that the MS 
Taipan show-trial (which is complex and still – in August 2011 – ongoing) will have no 
effects upon the situation back in Somalia, and is thus of limited effectiveness, but there 
                                                 
8  As reported in the BBC News, 3 October 2011. 
9  As reported by the Neptune Maritime Security Bulletin online, now subsumed into the ICC Commercial Crime 
Services site: http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures. 
10  ‘Somali Pirate Leader Gets Life in Prison for Yacht Hijacking’, 4 October 2011, Fox News. 
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is a general feeling that the responsible bodies need to toughen up and take sides. Al-
ready in 2011 a South Korean court has demanded the death penalty for a Somali pirate 
convicted of attempted murder of a South Korean captain on a hijacked ship, while on 
22 August two Somali pirates were sentenced to life in a US court. The US Congress 
has since set the penalty for piracy as a mandatory life sentence. 
Other voices, including that of the German political scientist Mathias Weber, have 
called for an international court to be established, which is currently being considered 
by the UN.11 The problem is that the costs of collecting evidence and holding the trials 
is too expensive, a deterrent to the running of the legal process. In Europe, the problem 
of establishing an international tribunal is compounded by the inevitable asylum pleas 
of Somali suspects. The problems, then, are chiefly political rather than legal: piracy is 
not on a par with crimes of genocide, or war crimes. Roger Middleton, a consultant for 
the Africa Program at Chatham House, thinks the problem is a more generalized one in 
which the rest of the world must also bear some responsibility: to stop illegal fishing 
and the dumping of toxic waste on the Somali coast creating a climate in which local 
people take to piracy. Simon Reeve’s recent BBC series on the Indian Ocean also plies 
this line: that the fight against piracy begins on land, rather than at sea.12 
A STUDY IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROCESS OF THE SUPPRESSION OF 
SEABORNE PIRACY BY EUROPEAN POWERS, 1680-1725. 
Piracy was an endemic phenomenon in early modern Europe, when international legal 
disputes raged as to whether property rights extended to the sea or whether the sea be-
longed to nobody as a res nullius. But beyond the specific legal arguments put forward 
by jurists like Hugo Grotius and Seraphim de Freitas, one can observe historically that 
when state authorities turned their back on maritime affairs (as was the case with the 
Ming dynasty in China), or when those state authorities were involved in protracted 
civil war (as was the case during the sengokku-jidai, the warring century in Japan prior 
to the Tokugawa), seaborne piracy invariably flourished. In Europe, state authorities 
actively connived at piracy, viewing it as an extension of military action against their 
enemies. For example, in the war-torn years prior to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, 
European nation states actively promoted piracy by issuing privateers with ‘letters of 
mark’ authorizing them to destroy enemy shipping and keep the loot for their troubles. 
The Dutch Seventy Years War against their Spanish overlords was largely conducted in 
                                                 
11  Reported by Deutsche Welle, 26 August 2011. 
12  BBC Two, Indian Ocean with Simon Reeve, ‘Kenya and the Horn of Africa’, broadcast on 13 May 2012. 
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this way, bringing a fleet of national defence (the’sea-beggars’) into existence in this 
way.13 
The point of departure of this paper will be a set of historical reflections as to how 
the problem of seaborne piracy was addressed and suppressed by European powers in 
the period 1680-1725. Means of enforcing stricter penalties, increasing naval patrols of 
                                                 
13  Virginia West Lansford, Piracy in the Golden Age Netherlands, 2005. 
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sea lanes and shifting official attitudes regarding the threat posed are all lessons policy-
makers today would do well to take heed of.  Not all attempts at resolving piracy were 
successful historically, and in what follows three different case studies shall be present-
ed: the piratic attacks by the so-called ‘Victualian Brothers’ against the Wendish cities 
of the Hanseatic League over the last fifteen years of the fourteenth century, a relatively 
small-scale challenge which had a wider international backdrop, but which was success-
fully extirpated; then, the case of Portugal in the sixteenth century, where piracy threat-
ened simultaneously on too many fronts, and was not successfully swept aside; and the 
case of Britain in the eighteenth, where piracy again presented itself as a global prob-
lem, but efforts to counter it were more far-ranging, handled by a specially commis-
sioned sub-state agency, sanctioned with new purposeful legislation, and where the fight 
was met with greater success.  
THE VITALIAN BROTHERS 
The history of the Vitalian Brothers (Vitalienbrüder/Viktualienbrüder) is that of a mixed 
bag of adventurers operating on both sides of the Danish Øresund or Sound and plun-
dering the regular dispatch of shipping of the Hanseatic League, especially the so-called 
Englandfahrer bound for London.14 The story is one that has unfairly brought certain 
characters to the forefront of history, namely the pirates Klaus Störtebeker and Godeke 
Michels, and their chief antagonist Simon von Utrecht, in the service of the Hanse. Op-
eras and novels have been dedicated to these men, and public memorial statues erected 
on, for example, the Kersten-Miles-Brucke in Hamburg at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. It is a history full of myths but also a history that still resonates in northern Ger-
many today, for the Simon von Utrecht  statue was decapitated and defaced during the 
night of the 5 June, 1985 and defiant graffiti along the lines of ‘Pirates still live!’  spray-
painted across the memorial. Even more recently, with the coming of the MS Taipan 
trial to the Amtsgericht in Hamburg, newspapers like the Hamburger Handelsblatt were 
quick to proclaim the ‘first pirate trial in Germany since that of Klaus Störtebeker’. 
Generalising historians like Susan Rose are quick to suggest that piracy was ‘seem-
ingly endemic in the Baltic’, whether conducted by individuals or operating to some 
commercial or political agenda; another of her summary impressions is that ‘piracy was 
so prevalent in the area that all vessels were prepared to defend themselves but (..) there 
are few if any accounts of more large-scale engagements’.15 While her first statement is 
                                                 
14  See the English complaints (Klageakte) of 1405; Friedrich Schulz’s account of English-Hanse relations in this 
exact period is very different, Die Hanse und England, Berlin 1911 repr. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1978, pp. 59-66. 
15  Susan Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare, 1000-1500, Routledge, 2002, p.19, p.72. For the first assertion, see also A. 
d’Haenens, Europe of the North Sea and the Baltic. The World of the Hanse, Antwerp: Fonds Mercator, 1984. 
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clearly exaggerated, indeed Bruce Gelsinger’s entry on the Hanseatic League in the Dic-
tionary of the Middle Ages indeed fails to even mention piracy as a historical problem 
for the League, the second of Rose’s statements is true only if one compares the number 
of ships utilised in the Sibetsburg expedition of 1435 with the naval battle at Sluys in 
1340, when the English mustered an impressive fleet of 160 ships.16 Sluys, however, 
was not the product of a systematic and repeated two-year engagement, as was the case 
with the Hanseatic Sibetsburg expedition, which also sought to engage a number of lo-
cal powers in the eradication of the problem. Other aspects of the naval conflict that 
Rose uses to substantiate her argument, for example, that there was little if any structur-
al difference between ships engaged primarily in warlike activities and those engaged in 
trade, are more pertinent and worth drawing attention to. While recent German literature 
is better informed, such as the book by Mathias Puhle, the purpose of his research is 
rather to seek to engage directly with the myth, and its distortions; Puhle fails to set the 
Vitalienbrüder against the wider international backdrop of the times.17 My purpose is of 
course rather to engage with the kind of piracy practised here, and how it was combated 
by authorities like the Hanseatic League. 
The problem of piracy arose with the power vacuum created with King Waldemar 
Atterdag’s death on 24 October 1375, which provoked the Counts of Mecklenburg to 
group bands of pirates together under their leadership and wage war against the Danes, 
in Puhle’s opinion ‘out of thirst for power and expansion’. In all reality, the Mecklen-
burgers were redressing an imbalance of power in the region after Waldemar had seized 
Visby.18 The flourishing of piracy in the power vacuums between rival states was a 
common background to major conflicts of the time like the Hundred Years War primari-
ly between England and France.19 This put the Hanseatic cities of Rostock and Wismar 
in a very difficult position, as they needed to show some solidarity with the neighbour-
ing Herzogshaus, but also had to follow Hanseatic policy, namely ordering all members 
of the Hanse to close their ports to close their harbours to pirates. In general, the League 
considered Mecklenburg far more dangerous than the Danes, although it had only re-
cently been at war with Waldemar, partly because Mecklenburg’s feelings, which also 
                                                 
16  Kelly DeVries, ‘God, Leadership, Flemings and Archery: Contemporary Perceptions of Victory and Defeat at the 
Battle of Sluys’, American Neptune, no. 55, 1995, pp. 1-28. 
17  Mathias Puhle, Die Vitalienbrüder : Klaus Störtebeker und die Seeräuber der Hansezeit, Frankfurt am Main: 
Campus Verlag,  1992; see, for example, C.J. Ford, ‘Piracy or Policy: the Crisis in the Channel, 1400-1403’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, vol. 29 (1979), pp. 63-78. 
18  Philippe Dollinger (trans.), The German Hanse, Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1964, pp. 78-72. 
19  Raphaela Averkorn, ‘The Sea as European diplomatic, political and economical battlefield in the times of the 
Hundred Years War’, in Luc François & Kathy Isaacs eds., The Sea in European History, Pisa 2001, pp. 191-217. 
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targeted anger at the Hanse for supporting Waldemar’s daughter Margaret as Regent in 
the Danish succession, were shared by Stockholm, and because Mecklenburg based its 
ships in Rostock and Wismar. These two port cities eventually complied with the Han-
seatic stipulation following the death of Count Heinrich III von Mecklenburg (died 
1383), but only after they had supported the Mecklenburg pirates ‘more or less open-
ly’.20 
The same pirates now switched to Danish ports, where they found support under the 
new Queen Regent Margaret. She wanted to see Hanseatic privileges in Scandinavia 
curtailed, and some sort of freedom on behalf of the four Sund castles (Schloss 
Kronborg, also the Scanian fortress of Hälsingborg) from Hanseatic claims to Pfandbe-
sitz. Hanseatic control of these four fortresses for fifteen years had been one of the 
clauses determined by the Peace of Stralsund in 1370. Margarete’s support for the pirate 
communities proved short-lived however, as she realised that collaboration with the 
Hanse at its apogee was a more pragmatic strategy, which stood a greater chance of her 
winning control over the destinies of the Sundschlösser. 
In this period, the Hanse often sought instead to scapegoat other powers for this ef-
florescence of piracy rather than take any direct action itself. The Diet of 1386 present-
ed King Richard II of England with a list of 22 separate incidents, of which six involved 
piracy, three robbery of goods after shipwreck and two other robberies on land, for 
which in sum compensation was demanded; a total of around £2,136 sterling.21 This led 
to understandably strained relations, not least Susan Rose argues because many were 
rather cases of commercial negligence or embezzlement rather than outright piracy. The 
theft of a Prussian cargo wrecked off Romney in 1386 by the local villagers was illegal 
perhaps, but not piracy. More clearly a matter of condoned violence against a rival hap-
pened off Brittany in 1378 when men from ‘English warships’ boarded a ship from 
Danzig, killed the captain and cut off his fingers to steal his rings before throwing him 
into the sea.22 Another extremely contentious issue was the demand for an enquiry into 
the alleged murder of the entire crew of a Danzig ship at Boston in 1384, to which no 
price could be set since the ship itself had been recovered. As it was Danzigers who 
seemed repeatedly to be at the end of English depredations, it is of no surprise that on 
18th July 1385 a diet of the Prussian towns ordered the arrest of English goods in Dan-
zig and Elbing and banned all trade with England. An embassy was dispatched to de-
                                                 
20  Mathias Puhle, Die Vitalienbrüder: Klaus Störtebeker und die Seeräuber der Hansezeit, Frankfurt am Main: 
Campus Verlag,  1992, 21.  
21  Die Recesse und Andere Akten der Hansetage, Series I (iii), nos. 142-3, 192, ed. K. Koppmann (Leipzig, 1870-
97). 
22  Dollinger, 289-90 (from the Hanserezesse). 
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mand compensation for another notorious incident, the Zwin robbery of six Prussian 
ships earlier in 1385, and all losses over the previous ten years, but the embassy came to 
nothing.23  
To this background of ‘low level maritime war’ between England and Prussia, the 
freely acting pirates we have been concentrating on were now chased out  of the Baltic 
Sea after the Hanse encharged one of its constituent cities, Stralsund, and specifically 
the Bürgermeister, Wulf Wulflam,  with the task of ‘pacifying the Baltic’ (Befriedung  
der Ostee) in March 1385. He was provided with ‘one great ship, as well as several 
Schniggen and Schuten and a hundred, well-armed soldiers’. This instruction is widely 
considered successful, although many thought he did not do a very thorough job, and 
that the problem of piracy in the Baltic was resolved rather through a lack of concrete 
support for their activities and continuance.24 
The pirates subsequently moved their operations away from the Baltic into the North 
Sea and again sought refuge and employment, this time under the East Frisian chieftains 
(Häuptlinge) like Edo Wiemkens at his later destroyed stronghold at the Sibetsburg. In 
all likelihood, these chieftains could supplement their primarily agricultural incomes by 
depredations on the flow of international seaborne trade westwards, taking advantage of 
the tense and fractious relations between the Hanse and the English, as we have seen, 
and with the Flemish, on whom the Wendish towns had proclaimed an embargo in 
1388, but which was repealed in 1392. The English government actually issued letters 
of credence to John Huntingdon and John de Wesenham as ambassadors to the Wendish 
towns. The chief purpose of this mission was to complain about the attacks of the 
Mecklenburg pirates, or Vitalienbrüder. Whilst the Diet was extremely tardy in its 
deliberations, it finally wrote to Richard II stating that the Hanse had no control over the 
Vitalienbrüder, who were anyway doing more harm to Hanse merchants than to the 
English. It requested, therefore, that the king should prevent his subjects from attacking 
Hanse ships in retaliation for damage done by the Vitalienbrüder. But the letter went no 
way to forming some sort of international alliance against the  pirates: it passed on to 
the matter of Hanseatic privileges in England, demanding their full implementation, 
threatening an increase of taxation on English merchants and a ban on the import of 
English cloth. While cities like Dortmund, protective of its own trade in England, had 
written to Lübeck in 1395 recommending the payment of compensation to the English, 
                                                 
23  Die Recesse und Andere Akten der Hansetage, I (ii), no. 309; (iii), no. 204. For English complaints, see T.H. Lloyd, 
England and the German Hanse, 1157-1611. A Study of their trade and commercial diplomacy, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 1991, 62-3. 
24  Puhle, 27. 
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it appears that the general consensus in the League was that England had anyway made 
good for their losses to pirates from attacks on other Hanse ships.25 
Figure 1: Reconstruction of the Sibetsburg, torn down on the instructions of the Han-
seatic cities in 1433. From a brass plaque placed with other information on 
a mound in Wilhelmshaven (December 2011). 
 
Matters developed until they came to a head with another Hanseatic punitive fleet sent 
out early in 1400 to put an end ot the ‘scandalous deeds’ (Schandtaten) which rendered 
navigation and trade further west so hazardous. These fleets were specifically composed 
of ‘Friedeschiffen’ or ‘peace ships’, which were, however, cogships (Koggen), fully 
kitted out for war. The maritime skrimishes, however, tended to be inconclusive as no 
long-term peace treaties were signed, and the pirates were dispersed rather than 
conquered, escaping to Holland and Norway where they regrouped and quickly returned 
to East Frisia, just as the Hanseatic fleet was returning to its home port. Victualling was 
limited, and other time constraints did not allow the Hanseatic fleet on such occasions to 
pursue their prey further out into the North Sea. The convening of annual Hansetage 
meant that up-to-date reports needed to be presented on these occasions, and hence 
swiftly prepared; it was altogether more sensible to follow the naval campaign up with 
letters to rulers like Margaret of Norway to persuade her to fight against the Victualian 
                                                 
25  Die Recesse und Andere Akten der Hansetage, nos. 189, 235. HR, I (iv) nos. 255, 2604 and Lloyd, England and 
the German Hanse, 71-2. 
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Brothers who had arrived on her shores. There was also the matter of cost: the ex-
pedition of 1400 had cost the Hanse 9350 Lübeck marks.  
The 1400 campaign had dispersed the Victualian brothers some of whom, as we have 
seen, went to Norway, but others went to Holland, where they sought refuge under 
Duke Albrecht. He allowed them to reside in Staveren and prejudice his enemies, but 
the agreement specified that they should not become unemployed and thus burdensome 
on the host and indeed a possible threat to him. Albrecht’s letter of 15 August 1400 
specifies 114 Victualian Brothers, including Störtebeker. It is worth making an effort to 
understand the context here. Holland had enjoyed a recent economic boom, and was 
now competing seriously with Lübeck and Hamburg. Holland had sealed a new trading 
agreement with the Prussian Hanse towns, which largely bypassed the influence of the 
Wendish Quarter (Hamburg and Lübeck) on their trade and traffic. On 18 October 1400, 
Hamburg felt compelled to send a sharp letter to the Prussian Hanse towns informing 
them of Dutch seizures of both Hamburg ships and goods and thus warning them to 
stop.26 
Another group went to work for the counts of Oldenburg.27 In any case, the story now 
becomes a little more unclear, and the entries in the Hamburger Kammereirechnungen 
are very short and inconclusive. There is confusion as to the dates of the next 
determining encounter. The Kammereirechnungen entry for 1401 stipulate the 
preceding year (anno preterito), which would be 1400, as the date for the offensive (ad 
Reysam) undertaken by the Lord Hermann Langhen and Nicholas Schoken upon the 
island of Heligoland. 
The Lübecker Rufus-Chronik relates how 40 sea robbers were killed by Hamburg’s 
fleet of outgoing Englandfahrer in Heligoland, and how 70 more were captured. They 
were brought to Hamburg and executed as a clear deterrent, much as the gibbetted 
bodies of pirates hung at Wapping were to do  more than three hundred years later: ‘ihre 
Köpfe setzen sie auf eine Weise an der Elbe als Zeichen dafür, daß sie auf dem Meer 
geraubt hatten’.28 The Hamburgische Chronik of 1457 states how ‘Anno 1402 ward 
Wichman unde Stortebeker afgehouwen altohant na Feliciani’; they were kept then until 
the next year before receiving their sentence.  Störtebeker’s ship, a ‘mittleren Holk’ was 
brought back and sold in Hamburg for 16 pounds, principally the mast and some other 
wooden components, while the city Kammereirechnungen enter the costs of the pirates’ 
                                                 
26  Puhle, 129. The Wendish Quarter was unable in the long run to prevent overtures from the Baltic towns to Dutch 
and English merchants; Eric of Pomerania actively invited foreign merchants to his realms to provide some com-
mercial competition.   
27  Josef Wanke, Die Vitalienbrüder in Oldenburg, 1395-1433, Diss. Uni. Greifswald, 1910. 
28  Chroniken der deutschen Städte, Lübeck, Bd. 28, 1902, p. 25. 
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punishment:  ‘1 Pfund Knokere ad faciendum foveam pro Vitaliensibus decollatis. 12 
Pfund bedello ad decollandum 30 Vitaliensis’, in other words one pound to dig the 
common grave, eight shillings per individual decapitated.29 A further entry ‘ 32 sol. pro 
querela Vitaliensium’ relates to, Puhle argues, the cost of torture in order to  acquire 
information thereby.30 The  overall cost of the expedition amounted to 57 Pfund. 
Figure 2: Wood block engraving of fight at sea with Störtebeker, 1401. 
 
We must presume that the action against the Victualian Brothers took place in the brief 
window before Duke Albrecht wrote another letter (Kaperbrief), this time dated 11 No-
vember 1400, in which he committed to engage around 150 further Victualian Brothers 
from the Counts of Oldenburg. We are obliged to see the motivation for this as replac-
ing his naval force which had been wiped out at Heligoland a short time previously. 
Presumably, they had been sent to Heligoland as a strategic move in the Dutch count’s 
ongoing war against Hamburg; a corollary reason would suggest that the island was in 
close ties with  several East Frisian chieftains, and would thus provide haven and possi-
ble supplies for the pirate fleet should such be needed. 
In the meantime, Godeke Michels had in all probability sat the winter out in Norway. 
The Rufus Chronicle continues the story:  
                                                 
29  1873, Bd. 1, p. 490. 
30 Puhle, 137. 
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Nicht lange danach [the overcoming  of Störtebeker] trafen dieselben Englanfahrer auf 
einen Haufen der Seeräuber und schlugen sich mit ihnen. Gott gab seinen segen der gu-
ten Helden gegen diese, so daß sie viele töteten und 80 von ihnen mit sich nach Ham-
burg führten; da wurden sie enthauptet und neben ihre Kumpane auf die Wiese gesetzt. 
Die Hauptleute hießen Michels und Wigbold, ein Meister der sieben Kueste. 
Tratziger’s Chronica der Stadt Hamburg written in 1560, tells the same story, albeit 
preferring  a date of 1402: 
Die Hamburger griffen die Seeräuber an, und erschlugen 40 von ihnen, etwa 70 wurden 
gefangen und gen Hamburg geführt, wo die geköpft wurden und bekamen, was sie 
verdienten (..) Nicht lang danach in demselben Jahr fingen die Hamburger noch 80 
Vitalienbrüder mit ihren Hauptleuten Godeken Michael und Wigbolder, welcher war 
ein promovierter Magister in den freien Künsten. Sie wahren alle gen Hamburg geführt, 
da selbst enthauptet und ihre Häupter auf das Brok zu den anderen gesetzt. 
The story was, however, in all truth, a little more complex. In 1401, Godeke Michels 
reappeared in East Friesland. On 24 March 1401, the Hanseatic cities gathered in 
Lübeck and addressed a common plea to their colleagues (Bundesgenossen) from 
Prussia to help fit out a ship with 50 armed men to patrol the Baltic, the Wendish cities 
emphasising that they themselves wanted to undertake such a venture (‘wollten dasselbe 
tun’) on the basis that Godeke Michels was almost certainly at sea and that he would 
sail for the Øresund.31 The Hamburg Kammereirechnungen indeed testify to the fact that 
230 pounds and 14 shillings were levied for the raising of an expedition to be led by 
Herr Nicolaus Schoke and Hinrik Jenevelt (sic).32 
The course of the expedition we learn from subsequent letters, particularly to the city 
of Kampen, explaining what had happened.33 It refers to the overcoming of Michels’ 
cog (Kogge) by the three ships leading the expedition. These ‘ships of the 
Englandfahrer’  in the words of the Rufus Chronicle were, as we learn from the 
specifications of the Hamburger Kammereirechnungen, under the leadership of Simon 
von Utrecht, Hermann Nyenkerken and Werner von Uelzen. On Michels’s flagship, the 
expedition leaders found Lubbert Overdik, whose own boat Die Jade had been  overrun  
by Michels’ crew, and which then fled upriver with the perpetrators. Overdik’s cargo, 
which was beer, was jettisoned in order to make the ship travel more easily, but was 
nevertheless captured and brought back to Hamburg. The letter concentrates on the 
division of the captured booty: one-third going to those who had financed the 
                                                 
31  Hanserecesse, I 5, nr. 8, pp 6ff. 
32  Hamburger Kammereirechnungen, 1873, Bd. 2, p. 2. 
33  Hanserecesse, I 5, nr. 5, nr. 54, p. 32. 
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expedition, one-third going to those who had carried out the expedition, and one-third 
going as compensation to the captain Lubbert and the merchant whose goods were 
stored on Die Jade. The letter written to Kampen asked that the parties to be compen-
sated, who obviously came from the city, should formally agree to this procedure and 
withdraw a complaint (Mahnung) that been voiced at the way the Hamburg authorities 
were proceeding. 
From the accounts of this expedition, and it’s winnings, the Hamburg Kammerei-
rechnungen again have a say: 
Die Rathmannen Nikolaus Schoke und Hinrich Jenevelt erhalten 1401 230 Pf. 145 für 
ihre Fahrt gegen die Vitalienbrüder in die Weser; 1402 empfängt Simon von Utrecht für 
seine Arbeit und vernichtetes Schiffsgeräth, als Gödeke Michels und die Andern 
gefangen wurden, 48 Pf., für Anker, Lanzen und Zimmermannslohn 6 Pf 4 S., für seine 
Arbeit und für Beschädigung seines Schiffes auf der Fahrt ggen die Vitalienbrüder 13 
Pf. 12 S; ferner erhalten Hermann Nyenkerken für seine Arbeit und vernichtetes 
Schiffsgeräth des Schiffes Bunte Kuh 32 Pf. und Werner von Uelzen 24 Pf., als man 
Gödeke Michels und seine Gesellen gefangen nahm. 
From the above, we can appreciate what a financial outlay the Hamburger Rat was 
obliged to make to combat piracy, and which was only partially covered from the sub-
sequent sale of confiscated cargos and ships. It is clear from the Kammereirechnungen 
that the Hanse did not possess its own permanent standing fleet ready to combat piracy 
or go to war, as was the case with contemporary monarchies such as that in England. 
Nor did it possess its own Arsenal, like that operating in Venice from 1206. What is 
striking are the claims from third parties to the events, who sought either to defend their 
citizens’ commercial involvement, or demand some compensation for their assistance. 
Thus the city of Leiden here protested that their citizen Gerrit de Bruyn owned a part of 
the beer on Godeke Michel’s boat, which was later sold by the Hamburg authorities.34 
Meanwhile, the city of Hoorn claimed its shipwrights had transformed some municipal-
ly owned cogships into warships, and had chased Godeke Michels at sea, preventing 
him moving on upstream until the Hanse’s vessels had caught up with him. They want-
ed one-third of the winnings from subsequent sales of the ships, and the goods they 
were carrying.35 
The Hamburgers retorted that according to the eyewitness accounts of the expedition 
commanders, there were forty men from Enkhuizen who helped rather than anyone 
from Hoorn. One of them, Gerrit Jakobsson claimed he had overcome Godeke Michels 
on the Jade as well as having personally provisioned ten Hamburg seamen on board, but 
                                                 
34  Hanserecesse I 5, nr. 52, p. 31. 
35  Hanserecesse nr. 46, p. 30 ff. 
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these claims were contradicted directly by Nikolaus Schoke, the principal commander 
(Oberfehlshaber) of the German fleet. A few years later Gerrit Jakobsson received 54 
Marks from the Hamburg Rat.36 
Historiographical attention wanes at this point, as the historic perpetrators of the pi-
racy which had come about in the wake of the Danish-Mecklenburg conflict were 
forced to face their sentence, although acts of piracy continued to flare up. Scholars like 
Rose prefer to see this as a state of ongoing ‘low level maritime war’ between the Han-
seatic League and the county of Holland and England – ‘warfare’ erupting over ques-
tions of access to markets and reciprocity in the payment of customs dues and other 
privileges for merchants, but divorced from considerations of territorial aggrandizement 
or rivalry between monarchs.37 In 1405, around 300 Vitalienbrüder gathered in Emden 
and its surroundings, where they robbed at sea. In 1408, five Hanse ships lost their car-
go in this way. The situation in Oldenburg and Holland continued to provide the Vi-
talienbrüder with a means of living. On the Baltic, too, there were sporadic losses, alt-
hough these were not Vitalienbrüder and had nothing to do with the Danish-
Mecklenburg conflict. 
The situation came to a head with another great Strafexpedition on the part of the 
Hamburgers aimed this time at the entities on land who harboured them in Sibetsburg 
and in Emden. In the former a grandson, Sibert Lubbenson of the notorious Edo 
Wiemkens, continued to host pirate communities in much the same way his grandfather 
had done. On 6 June 1433 Hamburg wrote to Göttingen that its help was needed in de-
stroying the Sibetsburg in revenge for fourteen days of plunder its merchants had suf-
fered. A memorandum produced at one of the Hanserecessen confirmed that neighbour-
ing cities should pull together to assist in the dispersal (Zerstreuung) of the pirates. The 
Hanse as a whole agreed to pay the costs (Kost und Zehrung) that this implied.38 Göttin-
gen and the other Hanse cities, however, failed to commit, so that Hamburg alone had 
again to single-handedly lead the offensive, aided by Lübeck and Bremen. Simon von 
Utrecht was again appointed to lead the twenty-one ship expedition. Emden fell to the 
party quickly, but Sibetsburg resisted more strongly, until mid-September. The Ham-
burg forces (Besatzung) stayed on in Emden to ensure the situation did not revert to its 
previous state; in 1435 the Sibetsburg was torn down in perpetuity. For Josef Wanke, 
author of a detailed study of the Vitalienbrüder in Oldenburg, this was the concluding 
chapter in a long story: 
                                                 
36  Hanserecesse 48-51, p. 31. 
37  Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare, 93. 
38  Ostfriesisches Urkundenbuch, Bd I, nr. 414, p. 31 ff. 
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Es waren die letzten Vitalienbrüder, die wir in den Oldenburgischen Gebiete antreffen. 
In der Graftschaft Oldenburg sind sie nach 1419 kaum noch gewesen. Ihr Name 
verschwand allmählich aus der Geschichte.39 
In Chapter 7 of his book, Mathias Puhle conducts some interesting research into the 
social origin of the pirates and the nature of their ‘Bruderschaft’, which found an echo 
in the many guild forms of the period. Like Arne Bialuschewski for the Golden Age of 
Piracy, Puhle sees the Vitalienbrüder as an urban proletariat, whose prospects were of-
ten worse than for day labourers in the countryside. He sees them as playing a role in 
the burst of civic conflict taking place in the 13th and especially the 14th centuries. 
This makes the Vitalienbrüder a very different prospect from the kind of English pri-
vateers like Robert Wenyngton and the Earl of Warwick picking on Hanseatic shipping 
in the middle years of the fifteenth century. The former was a respectable man of sub-
stance, a former mayor of the Channel town of Dartmouth, who put together a fleet in 
the spring of 1449 for the purposes, as British historiography would have it, of ‘the kind 
of sea-keeping patrol much desired by all English seafarers’, to the backdrop of an ever 
more anarchic situation in the Channel.40 What needs to be reconciled is the rhetoric we 
can find in his lengthy report, in which he stated his terms that foreign shipping 
acknowledge English claims to sovereignty of the seas in the Channel by ‘striking’ i.e. 
lowering their colours, and the results, the capture of two ships from Brest in Brittany, 
and the entire annual Hanseatic fleet sailing for the Bay of Bourgneuf, in his own esti-
mation ‘a fleet of a hundred great ships’, encountered in the waters between Guernsey 
and Portland.41 
There were considerable political issues behind Wenyngton’s action, not least the 
wranglings over Hanseatic privileges in London which were seen as increasingly unfair, 
in that the rate of duty they paid on the export of woollen cloth was lower that that paid 
even by local (denizen) merchants, their exemption on the poundage (as from 1437), 
and lack of reciprocity in granting privileges to English merchants in Hanseatic ports.42 
It is unclear why the fleet surrendered so tamely: the League had insisted from 1447 that 
all Hanseatic merchant ships be armed specifically so as to ward off pirates; perhaps the 
                                                 
39  Josef Wanke, Die Vitalienbrüder in Oldenburg, 1395-1433, 97. 
40  Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare, 94-5. 
41  His report takes the form of a letter of 25 May 1449 from himself to Thomas Daniel in the Paston Collection. It is 
printed in J.B. Hattendorf, R.J.B. Knight, A.H.W. Pearsall, N.A.M. Rodger and G. Till eds., British Naval Docu-
ments, 1204-1960, London: Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society, vol. 20, pp. 30-1.  
42  See S. Jenks, England, die Hanse und Preussen: Handel und Diplomatie, 1377-1471, Cologne/Vienna: Bohlau 
Verlag, 1992; J.D. Fudge, Cargoes, Embargoes and Emissaries: The Commercial and Political Interaction of 
England and the German Hanse, Toronto & London: U. Toronto Press, 1995, esp. 7-15. 
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Hanseatics (mistakenly) hoped to seek swift redress in the English Admiralty courts. In 
any case, it is hard to follow Rose in casting the story in virtuous light; contemporaries 
strongly suspected that most of the proceeds of this attack found their way into the 
pockets of some royal councillors.43 Wenyngton, who had already been pardoned for 
piracy and murder in 1445-6 was, however, once again pardoned, and served again as 
Mayor of Dartmouth in 1456-7.44  
The Hanse was not able to emerge from this setback very easily, and as stated, suf-
fered pretty much a repeat ten years later in 1458, when another ‘keeper of the sea’ 
Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick, took as many as 17 ships on the old excuse of the 
returning salt fleet’s refusal to strike in the name of the King of England.45 As the Han-
sards were not enemies, a commission of enquiry followed, and Warwick was called to 
Westminster, but a brawl ensued in which Warwick almost lost his life and escaped 
back to Calais unrebuked and unpunished.46 This story reveals King Henry VI’s failure 
to keep the sea, but also challenges staged against a Hanseatic entity in overstretch, and 
with a rather weak, dispersed, federal chain of command. The Hanse was clearly ne-
glecting to invest new military technology such as cannonry on its vessels, the deploy-
ment of which was starting to be seen (for example, the ‘guns’ in Wenyngton’s ac-
count), although the Hanse was soon to engage freebooters like the notorious Danzigers 
Paul Beneke and Martin Bardewik, operating out of Bruges, in developing its own 
Kaperkrieg.47 These were, as in the offensives led by Simon of Utrecht, essentially mer-
chant ships manned by extra levies of soldiers. The refitting of a vessel for military ser-
vice primarily attempted to create additional space for soldiers and their weapons, and 
accommodate whatever rudimentary cannon was available. Because they had to be re-
                                                 
43  See T.H. Lloyd, England and the German Hanse, p.181. 
44  J. Wedgewood ed., History of Parliament I, Biographies of the Members of the House of Commons 1439-1509, 
934; CPR 1446-52, London 1936, p. 570; for his own report, see ‘Robert Wenyngton to Thomas Daniel, 25 May 
1449’, in The Paston Letters, ed. J. Gairdner, Edinburgh, 1910, vol. I, pp. 84-6. 
45  Colin F. Richmond, ‘The Earl of Warwick’s domination of the Channel and the Naval Dimension to the Wars of 
the Roses, 1456-1460’, Southern History, vol. 20/21 (1998/9),  p. 7; T.H. Lloyd, England and the German Hanse, 
195; J. Gardiner ed., ‘A Short English Chronicle’, Three Fifteenth Century Chronicles, Camden Society 1880, 
p.71. For the 1447 injunction, see E. Daenell, ‘The Policy of the German Hanseatic League respecting the Mer-
cantile Marine’, American Historical Review, XV (1909-10), 48-53. 
46  Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1452-1461, p. 443. 
47  The classic account of the development of maritime cannonry by Carlo Cipolla still holds, ‘Guns and Sails’, in 
European Culture and Overseas Expansion, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1970, pp. 29-109. 
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victualled frequently and were in constant need of repair, they remained at sea only for 
short periods, usually not exceeding two or three weeks.48 
In conclusion, the problem of piracy posed to the Hanseatic League, particularly the 
Wendish section of the League, was a relatively circumscribed one, although at mo-
ments in its historical development it risked more widespread conflagration, particularly 
with the political backing of regional powers. Diplomatic initiatives, and group pres-
sure, saw that this only seldom became the case. Well orchestrated Strafexpeditionen of 
limited scale saw to it that pirates were not only put to flight, as happened with the ini-
tial encounter off Heligoland in 1400, but vigorously chased up, arrested, brought back 
to Hamburg and sentenced to death on the Grasbrook. Military deployments occupied 
towns that had provided refuge to the pirate communities. Dark clouds were, however, 
already appearing on the horizon as a result of the international situation and the in-
creasing militarization and free-for-all on important shipping routes like the English 
Channel. These were challenges it was not clear the Hanse could successfully surmount, 
particularly given the newly fledged confidence of rising nation-states such as England 
and Holland, but these challenges were not strictly piratical. It was the challenge of pri-
vateers acting nominally in rulers’ interests, but practically speaking seizing and im-
pounding whatever came their way in order to make up their scant official revenues in 
terms of poundage and tonnage dues from local ports. 
THE FAILURE TO ADDRESS PIRACY BY EARLY MODERN HEGEMONS LIKE 
THE PORTUGUESE 
Alongside shipwreck, piracy presented itself as the other singular menace to Portuguese 
shipping in its golden age (roughly 1450-1550). Piracy afflicted the Portuguese in dif-
ferent arenas at different times: off the western coast of India49; in the Ilhas Adjacentes 
(particularly the Azores)50; on the important trading run up to Antwerp; and off the 
western coast of Africa.51 Mirroring the vein in historical thinking that insists the Portu-
                                                 
48  P. Simson, Geschichte der Stadt Danzig bis 1626, Danzig, 1913-24, vol. I, p. 288; O. Lienau, ‘Danziger Schif-
fahrt und Schiffbau in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts’, Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtver-
eins, LXX (1930), 74. 
49  Michael N. Pearson, ‘Corruption and Corsairs in Sixteenth-Century Western India. A Functional Analysis’, in 
Coastal Western India: Studies from the Portuguese Records. New Delhi : Concept, 1981. 
50  Eduardo C.N. PEREIRA, Piratas e corsários nas Ilhas Adjacentes, 3 ed., Funchal (1965).  
51  I do not know any comprehensive work on this area, but examples of West African piracy can be found in Duarte 
Pacheco Pereira, Esmerlado de situ orbis, livro II, cap. 3; Eustache de la Fosse, ‘Voyage à la côte occidentale 
d’Afrique’, in Revue Historique, 1897, p. 197 ; and in the  Machim legend, first set down by Valentim Fernandes 
da Morávia, a German printer living in Lisbon in the early sixteenth century, see António Baião (ed), O Manu-
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guese empire was little more than an ensemble of heterogenous spaces with no unity of 
structure, we can similarly perceive that strategies to confront piracy in these different 
areas differed greatly. 
(1) Off West Africa, where the malefactors were a range of nationalities, chiefly 
Spaniards, typically sailing out of Seville, piracy was in part legitimated by the political 
struggle that had blown up between Spain and Portugal for the Castilian throne between 
1475-1480. Indeed, the Spanish Crown issued grants to merchantmen of Palos to trade 
at Mina de Ouro and harvest the quinto in the name of those monarchs, while the rich 
fisheries around the Rio de Ouro were regularly invaded by Canary islanders and black 
slaves were taken from the Gulf of Guinea.52  
The Treaty of Alcáçovas, signed on 24 September 1479, and a second one at Toledo 
in 1480 obliged the Castilians to renounce their maritime activities in the Gulf of Guin-
ea and recognize the Portuguese monopoly to navigation and commerce across seas it 
had only painstakingly conquered during the sixty years of the plano das Indias. This, 
however, proved difficult to enforce given the area’s physical proximity to the Spanish 
Canaries and the islands’ need to keep itself stocked and supplied, although we have 
record that Queen Isabella wrote to her asistente in Seville in November 1480 to expel 
English merchants who had arrived in Seville looking to employ Andalusian pilots and 
seamen.53 Nor were Spaniards prepared to accept the precepts behind these interdictions, 
and so this rivalry continued to flare until the discovery of the New World in 1492 pro-
vided Spain with a new arena.  
The problem was also a more general one for the Portuguese. Countless ships from 
Flanders, France, Castile and England subsequently appeared in the waters off the west-
ern coast of Africa, as an extension to Fernand Braudel´s famous thesis as to ‘the Medi-
terranean’s invasion by northern shipping’, which he situates around 1550, but which 
could in reality be brought forward in time.54 While the Portuguese sunk enemy ships 
                                                                                                                                               
scrito ‘Valentim Fernandes’ (ca. 1505-10), (Lisbon, 1940). A parallel, but seemingly independent record of the 
story appeared in a tract written by António Galvão, Descobrimentos antigos e modernos, (Lisbon, 1563), trans. 
Richard Hakluyt as Discoveries of the World (London, 1601).  
52  Jaime Cortesão, Los Portugueses, pp. 538-540; V.M. Godinho, ‘As incidências da pirataria no sistema português 
do século XVI’, in Mito, Mercadoria, Utopia e Prática de Navigar: séculos XIII-XVIII, Difel 1990, pp. 460-461; 
cf. José Sánchez Herrero, ‘Corsarios e Piratas entre los comerciantes Gaditanos durante la segunda mitad del sig-
lo XV’, in Studia, 1989, 47, pp. 61-79. 
53  Peter Russell, ‘Castilian Documentary Sources for the History of the Portuguese expansion in Guinea in the last 
years of the reign of D. Afonso V’, in Portugal, Spain and the African Atlantic, Aldershot: Variorum, 1995. 
54  For examples, see Anais de D. João III, Suplemento (t. II, p. 262) – ‘Relatório do vèdor da Fazenda, 1542’, Jean 
Denucé, L’Afrique au XVIe siècle et le commerce anversois, Antwerp: De Sikkel, 1937. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 172) 
- 21 - 
Figure 3: Map of the Early Modern Portuguese Overseas World. 
 
and either imprisoned or massacred the crews of numerous such voyages, as instructed 
per a notorious decree of John II from 1480, the profits were such that the return of one 
trespassing vessel could cover the losses of repeated failures, and so the flow of foreign 
opportunists grew rather than declined. Portuguese patrols were never adequate to cover 
the entire length of coastline: the Portuguese were forced to concentrate their attentions 
on Mina, and its gold, and S. Thomé and its sugar. In this way, the rest of the Gulf of 
Guinea ‘passed entirely into the background´ and the monopoly rights became theory, 
but in practice something of a dead letter.55 Portuguese rights, which were enshrined in 
prohibitions for Englishmen to trade via such deeds as the 1503 Charter of the Merchant 
Adventurers, were anyway contested by Englishmen who argued that they ‘had a right 
to trade to unsettled regions’; Frobisher had written a report where it was stated that 
there were no Portuguese forts between Cape Verde and Benin. On another occasion, 
they claimed access on the basis of tradition: that they were used to trade ‘without hin-
drance to Asia and Africa, as well as Europe’.56  
                                                 
55  J. Bouchaud, ‘Les Portugais dans la Baie de Biafra au XVIe siècle’, Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, vol. XVI, October 1946, no. 4. 
56  Shillington and Chapman, The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal, Ayer Publising repr., 1970, 136-
138. 
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Are we moving away from piracy here to mere contraband? In part, although the 
voyages of John Hawkins and Winters plundered Portuguese merchant vessels en route, 
causing widespread indignation.57  
(2) In western India, we need to understand that piracy was often a desperate last re-
sort on the part of respectable merchants from cities like Cochin whose livelihoods were 
jeopardized by Portuguese transgressions even of the unfair commercial rules that they 
themselves had established, like the forced purchase of cartazes or trading permits.58 In 
this instance, the merchant in question proceeded to the hostile city of Calicut and be-
came an inveterate enemy of the Portuguese. Others called by the Portuguese cossarios 
were rather guerilla auxiliaries of the Zamorins of Calicut who supplied protection for 
the merchants’ trade ships, though polities like the Mughals, when antagonized by the 
Portuguese seizure of vessels like the Rahimi in October 1613, instituted rather prohibi-
tions on entry into their ports.59 At times of war it would be true to say that anyone trad-
ing in pepper was considered by the Portuguese a ‘pirata’, though we have here an ex-
ample of patent misuse of the term.60 
The Portuguese responded in a number of ways. In the later sixteenth century, all 
Portuguese ships and native ships trading within their system sailed in convoys protect-
ed by warships (cafilas). Palm tree plantations growing in enemy areas were also cut 
down, so as to limit the amount of building materials at their enemy’s disposal, and took 
years to regrow. A third strategy consisted in changing the type of vessels they used, the 
heavy slow-moving boats of the early sixteenth century, which were easy prey to small-
er pirate craft, being steadily replaced by lighter vessels known as sanguiceis. 
But invariably the Portuguese resorted to violence, and would even disdain taking 
prisoners when they captured a Malibari vessel, hanging their prisoners from the yard-
arm before sailing into port ‘in order to terrorise the enemy and delight the city’.61 
                                                 
57  Eliz. Foreign State P. Calend., 16 August 1559, no. 1203. 
58  J. de Barros, Da Ásia, 4, viii, 12. 
59  See, for example, Elison B. Findly, ‘The Capture od Maryam-uz-Zamani’s Ship: Mughal Women and European 
Traders’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 108 (2), 227-238. 
60  Lakshmi Subramanian, ‘Of Pirates and Potentates. Aspects of Maritime Jurisdiction in Portuguese India and the 
Construction of Piracy’, Indo-Portuguese Encounters: Journeys In Science, Technology And Culture (9th Interna-
tional Indo-Portuguese History Seminar), ed. Lotika Vadarajan, 2 vols., 1998.  
61  Diogo do Couto, Vida de D. Paulo de Lima Pereira, pp. 76-77; Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa, (Lisbon, 
1960-67), vol. I, 422. 
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Figure 4: Janjira sea fort off the western coast of India.  
 
Note: Photo courtesy of K.N. Chaudhuri. 
Unrestrained violence, with unsure grounds for its application in the first place, here 
only provoked violent response. Consequently, Portuguese India was a dangerous place, 
which led to the decline of many western Indian ports and may have undermined the 
development of the Indian manufacturing system.62 But it had serious implications for 
Portugal herself. One Jesuit said that as a result of the Malabaris, the voyage from Goa 
to Cochin was more dangerous than that to Portugal.63 Another Jesuit, who observed in 
1575 how the Malabaris had become ‘absolute rulers of all the seas of India’ was not far 
wrong when he attributed that to ‘our [sic] sins and carelessness’, although he did not 
expand on his painful elegy.64 Piracy along the western seaboard of India was not elimi-
nated and continued to plague later generations of European colonialists, as the history 
of Kanhoji Angre (or Angria) in the 1690s shows only too well, who came to control 
ports from Kolaba south to Gherieh, that is, the coastal area between Bombay and Goa. 
An island fortress, in the possession of the Sidis, an African clan literally being 
pushed into the sea by relentless Maratha pressure. They had recently lost much of their 
shipping to Kahoji Angria, and civil war had erupted amongst them. There was no cen-
tral leadership in the clan, not much discipline, but the blind instinct for survival re-
mained via depredations on the unprotected Gujurati merchant. The English in Bombay, 
                                                 
62  Radhakamal Mukerjee, The Economic History of India, 1600-1800 (Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, 1967), 134-135. 
63  Documenta Indica, ed. J. Wicki, VIII, Rome (1948-), pp. 120-21. 
64  Documenta Indica, vol. X, 3. 
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however, stood in alliance with them, subsiding them, primarily to stave off the ill con-
sequences of the Marathas possessing themselves of the whole sea coast. Sir Robert 
Cown, Governor of Bombay (1729-34), nevertheless feared  that ‘they are such poor 
politicians and worse soldiers that I am afraid with all the assistance we can give them, 
they will scarce be able to maintain themselves’ [Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants 
and the Decline of Surat, c.1700-1750, Wiesbaden : Steiner, 1979 260-1] 
(3) Let us now turn to another arena in the Portuguese world in which piracy came to 
the fore: the English Channel and shipping run up to Bruges and, later, Antwerp. Some 
historians see piracy as a perpetual historical feature of navigation through the political-
ly charged waters of, say, the English Channel, but rather than the product of dynastic 
war, or as a response to indiscriminate violence, we are moving along clearer lines when 
we interpret this as the covetousness (sequiosas cobiças) on the part of countries’ ‘still 
at an inferior level of commercial and maritime development’.65 
While we know of losses of Portuguese shipping in the Channel from 1509,66 in a lit-
tle known report written at the end of the 1540s, which coincides more or less precisely 
with the period of the Portuguese Crown retraction, an anonymous merchant candidly 
expresses his protest that the hazards of trade with Antwerp had mounted steadily over 
the preceding ten years to the point of commercial impracticability: 
From around 1538-40, the merchant is noticeably exposed to pillage as the prey of 
almost all nations of the world; from 1540 to 1544 at the hands of the French, then be-
tween 1544-46 by the English, then from 1547 to 1548 by the Scottish and now, over 
the last year, starting up again with this French war of relief. It's a marvel that the sea-
borne traffic hasn't been entirely ruined.67  
For a number of maritime insurers of Antwerp, there were fears indeed of ruin. In a 
letter of April 1546, the English ambassador to the Low Countries, Vaughan, reported a 
series of petitions by fifty or so insurers to the City Magistrates and even the Privy 
Council, in which it was stated that they had lost 35.000 Flemish crowns between Feb-
ruary and mid-April of that year, mostly on ships coming up from Italy and Iberia. 
Dealers lay in wait at English ports to buy up the plunder as it was brought in, making 
                                                 
65  F. Cantineau, ‘Origines des relations commerciales entre la Flandre et le Portugal', Boletim da Sociedade de 
Geographia de Lisboa, series XVIII, Lisbon (1900), no. 1, 24 ff; GODINHO, ‘As incidências da pirataria’, p. 459. 
66  Carta do feitor em Flandres ao rei, Antuérpia, 13 August 1509 (Braamcamp, Feitoria, doc. no. 21). 
67  ‘Signamment depuis l’an 1538 et 1540, le marchant est exposé au pillage, ayant esté la proye de quasy toutes les 
nations du monde, comme en l’an 1540 jusques en l'an 1544 des Franchois, depuis de l’an 1544 jusques 1546 des 
Englois, depuis l’an 1547 et 1548 des Escossoys, et maintenant pour le dernier an commenchement de cette guerre 
de rechief des Francois. Il est à s’émerveiller que le trafic par mer ne fut pas entièrement ruiné’. Archives 
communales d’Anvers, Dossier Marine, Equipement de navires, no. 5011. 
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any thoughts of recovery of property impossible.68 In 1547, the Regent of the Low 
Countries, Mary of Hungary, convened her deputies in an emergency session to discuss 
the problem and responded by restricting the release of port exit licences. In 1551, Ant-
werp merchants delivered a petition to the Habsburg government claiming that pirates, 
principally Scots, had taken ships and goods worth an estimated 1.699.000 Holland 
pounds over the previous eight to ten years.69  
Sectors of international commerce that managed to weather this particular storm and 
the acute war years of 1551-53 that followed, seem to have arrived subsequently at a 
period of relative prosperity, though the war with France rumbled on until 1559 and the 
peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. Vincenzo Collodi of Lucca, based at Antwerp, could hope 
for the best in his capacity as insurer as early as April 1550 - ‘now that peace reigns 
between the French and English', he wrote, ‘[one] should be able to sail normally' (hora 
che seguita la pace tra francesi e inglesi. . [e si] doverà ragionevolmente navigare).70 
The period between 1553-1565 has even been described as the apogee of alum exports 
to northern markets, the dangers of sea travel rearing their head only subsequently, be-
tween 1566-1602, with the Dutch Revolt and the fierce waterborne depradations of the 
Seabeggars (watergeuzen). Antwerp customs records confirm that overall trade, meas-
ured as goods exported from Antwerp, rose steadily between 1543-44 and at the time of 
the treasurer Grammaye's report ten years later.71  
The first half of the sixteenth century had nonetheless been horrible to the Portu-
guese. King João III instructed his envoy to tell the ambassador at the French court, 
Ataíde, that between 1500 and 1531 ‘more than 300 ships of mine [but more probably 
‘mine' as in ‘my subjects'] have been taken (aos meus tem tomados passante de tresen-
tos navios).72 In a letter written three years later to the same ambassador, Dom João III 
expressed a figure as high as 350 Portuguese ships that he claimed had either been 
                                                 
68  Brewer & Gairdner, Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII, vol. XXI, pt. I, nos. 578, 
615. 
69  J.D. Tracy, Holland under Habsburg rule, Berkeley: University of California Press (1990), 93. 
70  Renzo Sabbatini, ‘Cercar esca’. Mercanti lucchesi ad Anversa nel Cinquecento (1985), citing the Archivio di Stato 
in Lucca, AG 127, n. 34. 
71  Jean Delumeau, L’alun de Rome XVe-XIXe siècle, Paris (1962), 217. Confirm the validity of the Antwerp customs 
statement taken from Essen, Contribution à l'Histoire du Port d’Anvers et du Commerce d’Exportation des Pays-Bas 
vers l’Espagne et le Portugal à l’époque de Charles Quint (1553-4), (1921), 30. Gerard Gramaye’s Memoriebook 
(1580-82) was published by jean Denucé in 1928. 
72  published in Fernando Palha, A carta de marca de João Ango, exposição summaria dos factos extrahida de 
documentos originaes e inéditos, Lisbon (1882), doc. I and as Letter #6, Letters of John III, King of Portugal, 1521-
7, Camb. Mass. (1931). 
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seized or plundered, including six or seven of his own fleet. Losses were estimated at 
one million cruzados.73 Godinho, in an independent reassessment of subsequent availa-
ble statistics on the issue, concludes that all in all a little more than 450 ships were lost 
by the Portuguese in the first half of the sixteenth century. The rate of incidence that he 
presents, moreover, (see Graph 11) concurs with the anonymous merchant's report with 
which we began this chapter, in that the years 1541-49 see a substantial rise in the 
amount of shipping lost, with the highest losses experienced immediately thereafter, 
between 1550-1551.74 What this amounts to, in Godinho's estimation, is the loss of as 
much as half the Portuguese national marine - ‘a terrible blow' (terrível golpe) indeed, if 
these statistics are to be believed.75 
I would contend that depradations represent a major issue in Portuguese maritime 
policy of the golden age. However, while for some historians they are satisfactory 
enough an explanation for the revocation of the Crown feitor from Antwerp (the royal 
order (carta régia) of 15 February, 1549), they cannot in themselves account for the 
collapse of crown trading in Antwerp at a structural level.76 For this we need to issues 
like the anachronism of the idea of crown controlled feitoria, or staple, and internal op-
erational problems.77 Moreover, while the problem of piracy could be outflanked, as 
                                                 
73  Frei Luís de Sousa, Anais de D. João III: supplemento, ed. R. Lapa, t. II, 237. The letter prompted the despatch of 
Rui Fernandes de Almada to the French court on January 1 1534 to communicate the gravity of the situation. We 
should not, perhaps, take the Portuguese Crown's estimates too seriously: it needed the French ambassador, Jean 
Nicot, to point out in 1560 that a register should be kept of Portuguese victims of French depradations including the 
full names of captain and crew as well as quantity, nature of merchandise and destination. Edmund Falgairolle, Jean 
Nicot (1897), xxxxv. In any case, the French King assessed the losses at 400.000 cruzados rather than the one million 
claimed by João, C.C. I, m. 43, doc. 25. 
74  See the report attached to Sousa's chronicle and entitled ‘Relação de naus que se perderam no caminho da India' 
[An account of ships lost on the route to India], computed for the period running up until 1551 and which include 
the ‘naus que se perderam indo pera Frandes com carga de especiaria' (ships lost on the Flanders run with cargos 
of spice). 
75  V.M. Godinho, ‘As incidências da pirateria no sistema português’, ch. 3 of Mito e Mercadoria, Utopia e Prática de 
Navigar - séculos XIII-XVIII, Lisboa (1990). Ana Maria Pereira Ferreira, who consacrated her PhD thesis to the 
problem of piracy as the principal determinant in political relations between France and Portugal in the first half of 
the sixteenth century, however, dismisses Godinho's work as ‘um panorama longínquo da realidade. . baseado 
apenas em fontes publicadas', Problemas Marítimos entre Portugal e a França na primeira metade do século XVI, 
dissertação de doutoramento em História ap. a Fac. de Ciéncias Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
(1991), nota #1, 7.   
76  c.f. J.A. Goris, Études sur les colonies marchandes méridionales à Anvers, 1458-1567, (1925), 236. 
77  See S. Halikowski Smith, Portugal and the European Spice Trade, 1480-1580, Ph.D. thesis defended at the Eu-
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was the case in 1568 when the Spanish silver fleets switched from using the Biscayan 
zabras on the run between Loredo to Antwerp to Mediterranean redistributive networks, 
from Barcelona to Genova and thence overland routes running north, the Portuguese do 
not appear to have taken recourse to this.78  
Nevertheless, it remains to be asked why the Portuguese Crown did not respond to 
piracy on the Antwerp run more concertedly. Godinho has described the Portuguese 
response to Breton privateering in the mid-fifteenth century on the sea-routes north to 
Flanders as ‘effective reprisals, reinforcing lively negotiations with the Duke of Britta-
ny’ (represálias efícazes, reforçando enérgicas negoçiações junto do duque de Bre-
tanha). Portuguese armadas were sent out expressly to chase up outlaws like the Bis-
cayan Joham de Laranda in 1488.79 As the sixteenth century wore on, and in line with 
her European competitors, Portugal moved from ‘effective reprisals’ to instituting a 
convoy system on her European trading routes. A more proactive policy was restricted 
to the biannual patrols sent out as part of the capitanias da mar from 1516 to Brazil, but 
as an analogy to a system already operating in the Indian Ocean. These capitanias were 
a jurisdictional grant of ports along the Brazilian coastline assigned by King Manuel 
and his Conselho between 1516-30 and on at least four known occasions. Between 
1516-1519, for example, a capitania da mar was granted to Cristovão Jacques. The 
capitães’s task was to lead small Portuguese armed squadrons up and down the Brazili-
an littoral, especially around the Rio do Prata.80 The system was extended to patrols 
along the Malagueta coast as far as Mina.  
Meanwhile, an escort system was set in place, charged with protecting Indiamen dur-
ing the first stage of their outward voyage up until the Azores, as well as home-bound 
fleets from the Indies, which were then similarly escorted from the Azores. This system 
was up and running from the time of Lopo Soares' return from the East in 1519. The 
ground rules were set out in the ‘Regimento para as naus da Índia nos Açores’ promul-
gated in 1520, and entrusted to the bureau of the Provedor das Armadas da Índia, Brasil 
e Guiné, whose seat was established in Angra do Heroísmo, and whose first nomination 
was Pero Anes do Canto.81  
                                                                                                                                               
ropean University Institute, Fiesole, 2001, §11.3, §11.4. 
78  Fernand Braudel, La Mediterranée.., Paris (1949), 376-381. 
79  Braamcamp Freire, ‘Expedições e armadas de 1488’, doc. no. 2, as cited by Godinho, Mito e Mercadoria, Utopia e 
Prática de Navigar - séculos XIII-XVIII (1990), 462. 
80  Carlos Mattoso Filipe, ‘Primeiro Contacto com Terras Brasileiras’ in Portugal no Mundo, ed. Luís de 
Albuquerque, vol. 3, O Descobrimento da Rota do Cabo e as suas Consequências. O Descobrimento do Brasil e 
suas Consequências , Lisboa, Alfa, 1989, p. 202.  
81  Artur Teodoro de Matos, ‘A Provedoria das Armadas da Ilha Terceira e a Carreira da Índia no século XVI’, in 
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Anes do Canto’s responsibilities were set out as the superintendence of all the de-
fence, supply and support of state voyages calling into port (escala) or passing by (pas-
sagem) the Azores. He was also to direct the armada das ilhas to convoy from Flores to 
Lisbon all the fleets sailing from Brazil, India and Mina. Between 1536-56, historians 
have noted at least twelve such armadas.82 Afterwards, the state embarked upon a policy 
of offering safe anchorage via the building of necessary fortifications. Evaluations of 
these provisions are mixed. Alberto Vieira, on the one hand, insists that the scheme was 
so successful that Spaniards at times solicited the support of the Azorean authorities.83 
Longer-term reorganization of the fleets for the Americas in terms of those bound for 
Nueva España and Terra Fierme saw to it that Terceira forged a role for herself as ‘uni-
versal escala do mar do poente’ in the famous words of Gaspar Frutuoso’s sixth book of 
his Saudades da Terra.84 On the other, official documents of shipowners' and mer-
chants' complaints regarding the depredations of French corsairs between 1521-37 only 
highlight the continued risks of trade with the Azores.85 During the Anglo-Spanish War 
of 1585-1604, joint operations of Elizabethan crown ships and privateers captured or 
lost as a result of English attacks seven Portuguese Indiamen.86 As a reaction, there is no 
doubt that Portuguese Indiamen stopped calling at the Azores87 by the end of the 16th 
Century and at Saint Helena after 1602 due to fear of privateering attacks. As no alter-
natives to these two ports of call were adopted, the so-called viagens de rota batida (that 
                                                                                                                                               
Luís de Albuquerque, Inácio Guerreiro (eds.), II Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa, Lisbon: 
Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical – Centro de Estudos de História e Cartografia Antiga, 1985, pp. 63-
72; idem, ‘A Armada das Ilhas e a Armada da Costa no século XVI (novos elementos para o seu estudo)’, Lisbon: 
offprint from Academia de Marinha, 1990. 
82  Vieira, Alberto, ‘A fortuna das Afortunadas’, in Oceanos, 2001, No.46, pp. 56-80. 
83  He is referring to ‘Înstrução dada a Juan Tello de Guzman, capitão general da armada que foi aos Açores buscar o 
ouro e a prata que lá se encontravam e acompanhar, desde aquelas ilhas até Sanlúcar de Barrameda, as naus 
espanholas regressadas da América’ (dated 30 April, 1554), Arquivo General das Indias, Seville, Patronato, 258.  
84  Frutuoso, Gaspar. Saudades da Terra, Livro 6, Cap. II. 
85  Ana Maria Pereira Ferreira, ‘O Corso Frances e o Comercio Açoriano na Primeira Metade do século XVI (1521-
37)’, in Boletim do Instituto Histórico da Ilha Terceira (1987) 45(1): 263-284. 
86  Paulo Guinote, Eduardo Frutuoso, António Lopes, Naufrágios e outras perdas da «Carreira da Índia». Séculos 
XVI e XVII, Lisbon: Grupo de Trabalho do Ministério da Educação para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos 
Portugueses, 1998, pp. 223-231. 
87  Rui Godinho, A Carreira da Índia – aspectos e problemas da torna-viagem (1550-1649) (unpublished MA 
thesis), Lisbon, 2000.p. 301. 
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is, voyages made without calling at any harbour) on the homeward voyage were insti-
tuted.88 
But although ships were usually safe in Portuguese metropolitan waters, they re-
mained painfully exposed on the trip up to Antwerp. Convoys of Portuguese ships, 
when recorded, either formed around the state fleets on their sporadic visits to Antwerp 
or else on an ad hoc basis. Antwerp's New Christian spice contractors arranged south-
bound fleets to travel together to Lisbon and Andalusia; it was most probably one of 
these fleets of mixed Spanish and Portuguese amounting to 50 sail that arrived by return 
in Antwerp in 1525.89  
Portugal's competitors, it needs be pointed out, saw far more readily to the protection 
of their domestic merchant navies. The Venetian galleys always went heavily armed and 
with a requisite number of bowmen aboard, while the Genoese insisted that merchan-
dise of any value be transported on board the armed galleys of the Commune. The 
Dutch authorities initially commissioned accompanying warships paid for by special 
levies (omslagen), but commuted this to stringent regulations demanding that west-
bound merchantmen carry double the usual armament or else sail in convoys of at least 
forty ships.  
At any rate, the Portuguese Crown took few active measures to confront the lawless-
ness on the high seas, preferring to seek alternative commercial outlets on the Mediter-
ranean, as we have speculated with the presence of a Portuguese feitor in Marseille in 
1524, or else operate through a series of ineffectual diplomatic missions and the repeat-
ed tendering of naive requests through diplomatic channels, which were only rebuffed 
insolently by a French monarchy openly encouraging ‘reprisals' via free distribution of 
the ignominious letters of mark (cartas de marca).90 An enquiry undertaken by the Por-
tuguese city of Guimarães on behalf of its shipping interests in 1532 concluded tearfully 
                                                 
88  Ibidem, pp. 367-373.  
89  G. Bertrijn, Chronijck der Stadt Antwerpen toegeschraeven aan den Notaris Geeraard Bertijn, published by G. van 
Havre, Antwerp (1879). 
90  see, for example, François I's famous carta de marca issued to Jean Ango authorising him to take what he liked from 
Portuguese fazendas, A.N.T.T., Gaveta III, m. I, no. 19 and m. II, no. 7; François’s letter of 27 July, 1530, to the 
governors of Provence and other royal provinces instructing them not to impede Jean Ango from seizing goods from 
the Portuguese in compensation for Portuguese depradations valued at 250.000 ducats as cited in Barata, Rui 
Fernandes de Almada. (1971); also Frei Luís de Sousa, Anais de D. João III, ed. M. Rodrigues Lapa, Lisbon (1938), 
II, 237, and Fernando Palha, A carta de marca de João Ango, exposição summaria dos factos extrahida de 
documentos originaes e inéditos, Lisboa (1882). For a treatment of the issue in secondary literature, see Charles de la 
RONCIÈRE, Histoire de la marine française, 5 vols., Paris (1909), especially v. III, chapter entitled ‘Ango et la 
liberté des mers’. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 172) 
- 30 - 
that in France justice was not served.91 International treaties such as the Treaty de Crépy 
of 1544, by which the French agreed not to interfere with the Portuguese and Spanish 
New Worlds, as the Fointainebleau agreement of June 1531, by which both sides com-
mitted themselves to the abolition of all issued cartas de marca and the immediate ces-
sion of reprisals, were nonchalantly reneged upon from the French side. Generous Por-
tuguese disbursements in gold bullion to the political protagonists (an indemnity of 
60.000 francs to Ango and 10.000 cruzados to Admiral Chabot, on top of loans to the 
King and annual pensions to Counsellor Montmorency and Chancellor Du Prat), which 
were intended to pay for the compromise, as was the case with the much more expen-
sive Treaty of Saragossa, ultimately led nowhere. The hopes reawakened with the estab-
lishment of a judicial body to broker a resolution, the Tribunal de Presas, composed of 
deputados of both countries, and which first met in Bayonne on 22 March, 1535, were 
dashed by French foot-dragging and accusatory polemic in which Portugal was castigat-
ed for its purported hostility to the Valois cause in the House's struggle against the 
Habsburgs.92 In 1558, the Venetian ambassador Capello declared that the King of 
France laughed openly at the protests of his Portuguese brother-in-law.  
Thus, in effect a hopeless foreign policy of sustaining benevolent neutrality to all 
sides backfired; rather than laud Portuguese neutrality as ‘a tour de force of cleverness' 
(uma obra-prima de habilidade), neutrality had none of the political pay-offs it might 
do in a more gentlemanly scheme of international relations. Rather, it made Portugal 
became open prey to not just French, but also English privateers working in the Chan-
nel, who responded to the ambiguous international situation and Elizabeth I's annoyance 
with the Portuguese for not conceding an inch on the principle of mare clausum with 
respect to non-European waters.93 This, which started out as a mere point of irritation, 
turned into a forthright demand on the occasion of any request on the part of the Am-
bassador of Portugal that his King reciprocally ‘vouchsafe to admit in his next naviga-
tion to Callicut some English men of the Kings appointment to adventure therewith for 
the provision of the realme for spice'.94 Unsatisfied, the English Crown, like the French, 
turned to issuing letters of mark, such as we find issued to a certain Mr. Winters, and 
                                                 
91  Livro dos roubos que os franceses e vassalos del Rej de França fezeram aos moradores desta vila de Guimarães 
e seu termo (1532), ed. Alfredo Pimenta, Guimarães, 1940. 
92  see, for example, A.N.T.T., Corp. Cron., pte. III, maço 13, doc. 12 and ibid., pt. I, m. 61, 56. In 1537, Charles V 
pressed the King of Portugal to forbid French vessels from entering the ports. 
93  P. S. Martínez, História Diplomática de Portugal, (1986), 104, taking his cue from Santarém, Quadro elementar das 
relações políticas e diplomáticas de Portugal com as diversas potencias do mundo desde o princípio da Monarchia 
portugueza até aos nossos dias, III, pp. LXIV-LXV. 
94  British Library, Cotton, Nero, B I, doc. 74 (‘out of the Counsell table booke’), Slyford, 14 October, 1541. 
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even went so far as to sign a treaty of war with the French Crown and which specifically 
targeted ‘the ships of Portugal bearing spices and other goods via the said Strait and 
Low Countries and lands of the Emperor' (les navires de Portugal chargées d'espiceries 
et autres marchandises par led. Destroit et basses régions et païs de l'Empereur).95 
Ultimately, the Portuguese were forced to toughen up and take sides. Naval forces 
for the protection of metropolitan Portugal were increased substantially; twenty armed 
latinos of 25 to 30 tons, grouped in six flotillas each with its own port of supply, were 
made available and four galleons were instructed to patrol the Atlantic coastline, while 
one navio grosso and three caravels were to keep watch over the Algarve. The tradition-
al Portuguese neutrality was compromised by an agreement made with the Emperor to 
coordinate actions against the French. Provisions directed at ‘all the ports and Portu-
guese points of anchorage' (todos os portos e ancouradores portugueses) decreed that 
no boat or caravel could sail ‘for the North or West' (para a Poente) without a royal 
license. This echoed imperial policy which from the early 1540s required that even the 
Portuguese Crown factor in Antwerp obtain a licence from the Regent in order to ex-
port.96 But these measures, for what they were worth, were made too late in the day to 
have any influence on the fate of the Antwerp feitoria, which as we have seen, was 
closed in 1549: they were announced only at the beginning of 1552.97   
We have looked at the threat posed by maritime piracy to Portuguese trading circuits 
in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. To be understood in context, however, pira-
cy ought to be set against the dangers of shipwreck that accompanied forwarding com-
mercial shipments by sea from Portugal. For although the trading opportunities at Ant-
werp as trumpeted by Lodovico Guicciardini and many others are well known, navi-
gating the rough and exposed waters of the Atlantic was of a different technical order to 
the relative security of criss-crossing an inland sea (cabotagem) like the Mediterrane-
                                                 
95  British Library, Cottoniana, codice Nero, B. I. ‘Reasons for a Portugall to move the trade into England’, January 29, 
1569, point #15, fol. 147v; see Ana Maria Pereira Ferreira, Problemas Marítimos entre Portugal e a França na 
primeira metade do século XVI, from Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris, Nouv. Acq., no. 9388, fl. 46-49 v. 
96  documents in A.H.P., t. II (1904), pp. 243 ff and Pedro de Azevedo, Defesa da navegação de portugal contra os 
franceses, t. VI (1908), p. 161 ff. and particularly 164-65. For imperial licenses from Antwerp, see R. Haepke, 
Niederländische Akten und Urkunden zur Geschichte der Hanse und zur Deutschen Seegeschichte, Munich (1913), 
372. The contractors, equally, needed permission in the form of a sauf-conduict, sauvegarde et seurté from the 
Emperor and the Chancellery of the Brabant Court in order to import into Antwerp, GORIS, Étude sur les colonies 
méridionales.., 202. 
97  Godinho, ‘As Incidências da Pirateria no Sistema Português do Século XVI’, in Mito, Mercadoria, Utopia e Prática 
de Navegar, (1990), 473. 
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an.98 Shipwreck on the shipping route up to Antwerp took a steady toll on Portuguese 
shipping, as vividly described from personal experience by Matteo da Bergamo, or in 
the letters sent out by the Portuguese King seeking restitution of goods recovered in 
such incidents.99 The precise losses are conveniently summed up in a report attached to 
Sousa's chronicle and entitled ‘Relação de naus que se perderam no caminho da India' 
[An account of ships lost on the route to India], computed for the period running up 
until 1551 and which include the ‘naus que se perderam indo pera Frandes com carga de 
especiaria' (ships lost on the Flanders run with cargos of spice). The final count is five 
ships and 300.000 cruzados loss on the trato de Europa, out of a total estimated loss of 
31 ships and 3.352.150 cruzados.100  
Table 1: Losses of the King's spice ships due to shipwrecks, 1521-51. 
 Number of  
ships lost 
Total value  
of cargo lost 
Average cargo  
per ship 
Cape route. Outbound. 13 552.150 50.000 
Cape route. Inbound. 10 2.450.000 250.000 
India-Hormuz 3 50.000 16.666 
Lisbon-Antwerp 5 300.000 60.000 
TOTAL LOSSES 31 3.352.150  
As much as a sixth of the Crown fleet running the spice trade and lost to the rocks fell 
victim on the redistributive leg between Lisbon and Antwerp; ignored by the genre of 
literature that emerged as ‘A História Tragica Maritima', which was devoted to heroic 
tragedies at sea and sought exotic settings for its tales, the Antwerp leg was in propor-
tion to the fleets' overall mileage as perilous an undertaking as a journey to the coast of 
Malabar.101   
BRITAIN STARTS TO MOVE AGAINST PIRACY 
In attempting to explain why European states (primarily Britain and France) moved on 
to take legal measures against sea-borne piracy at the end of the seventeenth and during 
the eighteenth centuries, I would like to approach the problem from three perspectives: 
                                                 
98  Lodovico Guicciardini, Descrittione di tutti i Paesi Bassi, Antwerp, 1567. 
99  see Prospero Peragallo, ‘Viaggio di Matteo da Bergamo in India sulla flotta di Vasco da Gama, 1502-3', in Bolletino 
della Società geografica italiana, XXXIV (1902); for an example of the second type of literature, see ‘Carta do Rei 
D. João III ao Cardinal Wolsey', dated Coimbra, September 10, 1527, B.L. Cotton, Nero, B. I, fol. 64. 
100  taken from Frei Luís de Sousa, Anais de D. João III, ed. M. Rodrigues Lapa, Lisbon (1938), II, 237 & 243; 
suplemento, t. II, pp. 291-2. 
101  Giulia Lanciani, Tempeste e Naufragi sulla via delle Indie, Roma: Bulzoni (1991). 
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(1) Challenging the universalistic model for the development of 
commercial law 
Greater efforts need to be made to factor in the international political situation into an 
understanding of state attitudes to piracy. Thus, rather than a deterministic and universal 
model for the development of commercial law, we need to see the fight against piracy as 
a particular episode in the emergence of the pax Britannica.102 While the pax Britannica 
was only really an achievement of the nineteenth century, Paul Kennedy notes how ‘the 
governments of the 1650s were the first in English history to have a world strategy’.103 
Such a global strategy was needed to conceive of confronting piracy as a global prob-
lem. 
During the sixteenth century, England had been encouraging piracy as a means to 
usurp Spanish claims to overseas possessions (for example the Drake voyages against 
Panama), or in waging war against their arch-enemy the French.104 Piracy was presented 
as patriotism, or even as part of a Protestant crusade, especially when it took place in the 
Caribbean or South Atlantic.105 It consequently flourished in Elizabethan England: Stud-
land Bay in Dorset was the site between 1581-83 where at least 40 stolen vessels were 
unloaded and stripped. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, Britain had become 
‘the largest free-trade area in the world’.106 She had become a land-owning power in 
North America and the Caribbean, producing exportable material wealth that constituted 
prospective booty to pirates operating there. Piracy was now a problem to England  it-
self. We can perhaps detect an intervening period of ‘Jacobean pacificism’ when piracy 
was no longer the glamorous occupation it had once been, and where instructions to 
wreak havoc on erstwhile hostile powers like Spain were now substituted by instruc-
tions to apprehend pirates ‘having no sufficient Commission’ from the times of James’ 
predecessor.107 
                                                 
102  For such a deterministic reading, see Johannes Flume & Jan Thiessen, Entwicklungsgeschichte des Handelsre-
chts: Synoptische Darstellung, bestehend aus ADHGB, HGB 1897, heutigem deutschen Handelsrecht und öster-
reichischem Unternehmensgesetzbuch, de Gruyter (Rechtswissenschaften): 2010; Douglass North, The rise of the 
western world: a new economic history, Cambridge : Cambridge University Pr., 1973. 
103  God’s Englishman, 166-68; Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1961, 156-60. 
104  23 privateers were issued with letters of marque in June 1558 to take their own rewards at the expense of the 
French.  
105  David Loades, ‘From the King’s ships to the Royal Navy,1500-1642’ in Hill & Ranft, The Oxford illustrated 
history of the Royal Navy, Oxford U.P., 1995, 42. 
106  K. Berrill, ‘International Trade and the rate of economic growth’, Economic History Review, 2nd series, XII, 1960, 
358. 
107  Claire Jowitt, ‘Piracy and Politics in Heywood and Rowley’s Fortune by Land and Sea’, Renaissance Studies, 
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The shift from one prevailing logic to another was not, however, black-and-white. Brit-
ain remained a major privateering power throughout the eighteenth century.108 But of all 
European powers, Britain had the highest proportion of gross national product and em-
ployment linked to foreign trade. A failure to defend it would have catastrophic fiscal 
consequences, with incalculable results for naval expenditure. As one pamphlet entitled 
‘News from the sea: OR, the Takeing of the Cruel Pirate’ explained in 1674: ‘Amongst 
all the rapacious violencies practiced by wicked Men, there is scarce any more destruc-
tive to Society and Commerce then that of Piracy, or Robbers of the Sea, whence in all 
Ages they have been esteemed, Humani Generus hostes, Publique Enemies to Mankind 
whom every one was obliged to oppose and destroy, as we do Common vermine that 
Infest and trouble us.’109 And at the trial (b. 1696) of Avery’s crew for their piratic acts 
committed against the Ganj-i-Sawai, the Judge Advocate of the Admiralty, Dr. Thomas 
Newton, reminded the jury of the consequences of allowing the acquittal of the defend-
ants: ‘the destruction of those innocent Englishmen’ engaged in trading, as well as ‘the 
total loss of the Indian trade, and thereby the impoverishment of this kingdom’.110 
We have plenty of historical evidence to show how pirates were quite ready to turn 
against their own co-nationals when the occasion presented itself. Piracy was not in oth-
er words the extension of war unofficially against England’s enemies, even though 
Spaniards figured amongst common targets in the sixteenth century, and Mughal and 
Muslim pilgrim vessels in the Red Sea figured in the later seventeenth century as a pop-
ular target for British pirates as is well known from the adventures of Captain Kidd and 
Henry Every.111 
(2) It would be convenient to argue that the suppression of maritime piracy was an 
achievement of the rising power of the European state. In this context, it is interesting to 
note how the home government in London moved more quickly and determinedly 
against Caribbean piracy than local populations did in the Caribbean basin, who con-
nived with the pirates’activities, supplying them with services and selling them stolen 
                                                                                                                                               
June 2002, vol. 16, issue 2, 217-19. 
108  See Meyer, ‘English privateering in the War of the Spanish Succession’, Mariner’s Mirror, 69, (1983); R.P. 
Crowhurst, ‘British naval responses to privateering, 1793-1815’, paper given at Huddersfield conference and con-
sidered forthcoming. 
109  ‘News from the sea: OR, the Takeing of the Cruel Pirate’, 1674. 
110  William Cobbett ed., A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes 
and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783, 1816, pp. 451-484. 
111  Robert Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates, Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1986; Douglas Burgess 
Jr., ‘Piracy in the Public Sphere. The Henry Every Trials and the Battle for meaning in 17th century Print Cul-
ture’, Journal of British Studies, October 2009, vol. 48, issue 4, 887-913. 
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merchandise. In this second line of research, I would like to conduct a study of a sub-
state institution like the Royal Navy, to determine to what extent its own interests di-
verged or indeed converged with those of the state.  
There is considerable controversy as to the role of the British Admiralty. One the one 
hand, historians have seen it as something of a feckless, reactionary institution that was 
slow to grasp pressing realities. As recently as the Nine Years War (1689-97), the Ad-
miralty had shied away from coming to the help of the East India Company in bringing 
pirates to heel, arguing it did not have enough ships to assist the Company. The Admi-
ralty had sought to defend itself from the charge that it had obstructed the fight against 
pirates, by claiming that it was not possible to commission privateers to fight pirates.112 
At the same time, common law gradually stripped from admiralty law its authority over 
non-tidal waters and maritime disputes arising on land.113 On the other hand, British 
historians applaud the arrival of a permanent bureaucracy at the Admiralty under com-
missioners during the twenty years following the Nine Years War. A permanent loca-
tion was fixed, the Secretary became a permanent position, and its records ceased to be 
regarded as personal belongings of its chief or secretary. The French navy is seen by 
these historians as hampered for lack of its own admiralty. 
The major breakthroughs, however, were not slow in coming. As Paul Kennedy ex-
plains, the really great changes in the Royal Navy were in its functions, and composi-
tion. From being an assembly of vessels provided  for by the monarch and certain no-
bles and merchants, it became a national force, paid for by regular votes of Parliament; 
from being an occasional and motley body, it became a standing and homogenous fleet; 
from being almost without administrative and logistical support whatsoever, it devel-
oped a structure of dockyards, provisioning, accounting, recruitment and training; and 
from being a force directed by gentlemen amateurs, whose understanding of sea power 
was limited and whose private interests often conflicted with those of the state, it fell 
under the control of professional seamen, guided by its ‘Fighting Instructions and Arti-
cles of War’, directly responsible to the government as an instrument of national poli-
cy.114 Sociologists like Norbert Elias have studied the social tensions at work in the Na-
vy between the lowly ‘tarpaulins’ equipped with the skills needed for handling the mari-
time environment and the mindset of the still feudal military classes interested and 
trained rather for fighting, arguing that the openness of the conflict enabled social mo-
bility and improvement.115 
                                                 
112  Hargrave, 1777, 342. 
113  M.J. Pritchard and D.E.C. Yale, Hale and Fleetwood on Admirality Jurisdiction (London: Selden Society, 1993). 
114  Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, Allen Hall, 1976. 
115  Norbert Elias, The Genesis of the Naval Profession, University College Dublin Press, 2007. 
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Table 2: Ships and tonnages, 1680-1815 
 Numbers Displacement tons (000s) 
Year Line of Battle Cruisers British French  Dutch 
1680 95 20 129 132 64 
1690 83 26 124 141 68 
1695 112 46 172 208 106 
1700 127 49 196 195 113 
1710 123 57 201 171 119 
1715 119 63 201 108 98 
1720 102 53 174 48 22 
1730 105 49 189 73 73 
1740 101 58 195 91 91 
1745 104 98 231 98 55 
1750 115 108 276 115 41 
1755 117 108 277 162 113 
1760 135 172 375 156 137 
1765 139 136 377 175 124 
1770 126 112 350 219 165 
1775 117 115 337 199 198 
1780 117 187 372 271 196 
1785 137 181 447 268 211 
1790 145 180 459 314 242 
1800 127 264 546 204 127 
1805 135  569 182 139 
1810 152 3906 7256 194 100 
1815 126  616 228 60 
Note: These are official navy lists, and refer to the mobilizable force. British ships of the line of battle did not in-
crease much; cruiser class advances were more substantial. The table shows that their numbers tripled over the period 
1710-1760 and rose almost seven times by 1810. 
How did these changes come about? Samuel Pepys put it down to dynastic good for-
tune: ‘If it had not pleased God to give us a King and Duke that understood the Sea, this 
nation had ‘ere been quite beaten out of it’.116 But it was more than just this, the whole 
country came round in 1690, after the debacle off Beachy Head, to the wholesale sup-
port of the Navy in the face of what looked like a country open to invasion. A new 
dockyard in Plymouth was envisaged and a special fund voted for the building of 27 
men-of-war. Bishop Burnet described the mood in the Parliament that autumn: ‘they 
(MPs) dare not go back into their country if they do not give Money liberally. We seem 
not to be the same people we were a year ago’. Massive growth resulted from this 
                                                 
116  Daniel A. Baugh, ‘The 18th century Navy as a National institution’, p. 120 (in Oxford Illustrated History of Royal 
Navy). 
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change of outlook; by 1713, 48.000 seamen were registered in the Royal Navy. We can 
also appreciate this growth in the rise of British shipping and tonnage when compared 
with other European rivals.117 
The Navy, meanwhile, was also empowered to hold trials for cases of suspected pira-
cy, which was legalised by the statute of 1700, entitled an ‘Act for the More Effectual 
Suppression of Piracy’, and this concretized the navy’s role as state substitute. Attempts 
to shift prosecution of pirates to colonial forums were also negated by this piece of leg-
islation, which created instead a special procedure for staffing a seven-person court in 
any location. Thus, while some scholars have argued recently for the development 
‘ocean regionalism’ with regards to the treatment of piracy, this remains very much the 
view from abroad.118 Metropolitan statutes were not, in their wording, articulated in 
terms of a variable geometry applying certain criteria to different regions of the world. 
The importance of this piece of legislation reverberated in later legal texts, such as the 
Articles of War of 1749, which reminded ‘captains, commanders or other officers of any 
of His Majesty’s Ships or Vessels of War’ that receiving any ‘goods or merchandizes 
whatsoever, in order to trade or merchandize with pirates’ was an offence worthy of 
court martial.119 
The Navy pushed hard against piracy, actively pursuing pirates on international wa-
ters. Rewards were used to get bystanders to turn pirates in to the authorities, perhaps 
the most famous of all being the combined bounty of £1,000 offered for Henry Avery’s 
capture by the Privy Council and the East India Company, leading to the first worldwide 
manhunt in recorded history.120 There was initially a softer line of official pardons to 
pirates, particularly in the years 1717 and 1718. But generally speaking, the highest 
punishments were applied and especially the death penalty, to those guilty of piracy; 
one historian has recently estimated that between 400-500 pirates were hung between 
1716-1726.121 Execution Dock in the Wapping area became the notorious spot at which 
                                                 
117  We must discard the old histories that consider the Royal Navy in decline over the period 1700-40. This view was 
based on figures pertaining to ships in the line of battle. Also, if we take a comparative European view, it was the 
French Navy that really fell into decline. The really remarkable thing, Baugh argues, is that the British did not re-
duce her fleet in light of the decay of the French Navy.   
118  Lauren Benton, ‘Legal spaces of empire: piracy and the origins of ocean regionalism’, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 47: 4, 700-24. 
119  This  statute (?) is repr. as Appendix I in Markus Eder, Crime and Punishment, 158-173. 
120  Douglas R. Burgess. The Pirates' Pact: The Secret Alliances Between History's Most Notorious Buccaneers and 
Colonial America. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill (2009), p. 144. 
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pirates, smugglers and mutineers that had been sentenced to death by Admiralty courts 
were hung, and several gibbetted as a means to deter other possible offenders. In court, 
many of the pirates’ traditional lines of defence were cracked down upon. Many pirates 
had exploited flawed commissions, or changed their names. Others presented ‘piracy’ as 
the upshot of an attempt to put down querulous crews. But Marcus Rediker has shown 
how the hard line pursued by the  prosecuting authorities on the high seas and in coloni-
al courts only provoked pirates, particularly in the period between 1722-26 to ‘give up 
on legitimacy’ and become more desperate. Although some pirates, like Thomas Anstis, 
are known to have actively awaited a specific pardon from King George II, after he had 
issued a general pardon in 1718, it is generally held that since the graces specified that 
only certain crimes committed at certain times and in specific regions would be forgiv-
en, many pirates saw enormous latitude for official trickery and refused to surrender. 122 
Other historians have suggested pirates were reluctant to go back to the unemployment 
and hardship they had experienced in early life. 
The numbers tell their own story, however. Contemporary estimates of the pirate 
population during the period under consideration placed the number between one to two 
thousand at any one time. But from records that describe the activities of pirate ships 
and from records or projections of crew sizes, it appears that between 1800-2400 Anglo-
American pirates prowled the seas between 1716-18, 1500-2000 between 1719-22, and 
1000 to 1500 declining to fewer than 2000 between 1723-26. 
It remains to be established how many of these capital punishments were actually di-
rectly prompted by the Royal Navy, and not some other agency, for example, colonial 
governors. It was the Governor of Virginia, Alexander Spotswood, for example, who 
arranged for a party of soldiers and sailors to find and capture ‘Blackbeard’ (our arche-
typal pirate of the era, whose real name was Edward Teach), which they did on 
22 November 1718, although it was Lieutenant Maynard of the Royal Navy who located 
the pirates anchored on the inner side of Ocracoke Island, in the evening of 21 Novem-
ber.123 James Jones argues that the Navy was not a decisive instrument of power until 
the period 1757-63, even though the swift and successful British naval mobilizations in 
1726-31 and again in 1734-5 made Jacobite proposals for invasions of Britain appear 
ridiculous.124 
                                                 
122  For Anstis, see M. Rediker, Villains of All Nations, 155; for refusals, see C. Pennett, Bandits at Sea. A Pirates’ 
Reader, New York University Press,2000, 154. 
123  Konstam, Angus (2007), Blackbeard: America's Most Notorious Pirate, John Wiley & Sons; Colin Woodward, 
The Republic of Pirates, Harcourt Press 2007, 289.  
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Regardless of the state-building process, Kris Lane has suggested that the Navy’s 
primary self-interest was fear of losing its own employees (merchant seamen) to piracy. 
Many prominent pirates like the Welshman Bartholomew Roberts were, for example, 
ex-Royal Navy men.125 Lane goes on to show that the size of the Royal Navy was in-
versely proportional to the pirate congregation.126 We can see the progress of the offen-
sive against piracy, consequently, in the number of men serving the navy, which in-
creased from 6298 in 1725 to 16872 in 1726, and then to 20697 in 1727.127 
As much as pirates were actively hunted down, others were enticed into the Royal 
Navy through an assortment of incentives. Convicted criminals, even pirates like Henric 
Muller and Samuel Dring in 1760, were offered the chance to enter either the army or 
the navy in exchange for a royal pardon.128 Others who were indicted, but not yet sen-
tenced, were also given the opportunity to enter the armed services in lieu of trial.129 
This was particularly true at times of war. Admittedly, such a policy created a backlash 
particularly amongst that most reactionary of naval institutions, the Admiralty. In a 
memorandum of 1771,  for example, the Lords of the Admiralty expressed their wish 
that ‘no more convicts (…) be ordered on board HM’s ships, As such persons may not 
only bring distempers and immoralities among their companies, but may discourage 
men of irreproachable character from entering into HM’s service, seeing that they are 
ranked with common malefactors’.130 
But at no time did the Navy improve its wages. These were notoriously low and pro-
voked high rates of desertion, particularly during wartime, a problem compounded by 
seamen always standing last in the queue of creditors. In 1686, the naval wage for an 
able seaman stood at 24 shillings (£1.20) per lunar month, and remained unchanged for 
more than a century until a petition of 1797 resulted in mutiny and an immediate 23% 
pay increase. Ministers and parliaments instituted measures in 1728 and again in 1758 
for the navy to pay wages more regularly, but nothing was done to raise wages despite 
the glowing rhetoric in the public domain regarding sailors as the true saviours of the 
nation. Yet – to compare -  at the height of the Seven Years War, wages in merchant 
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ships reached £3 or more. To be more precise, the average pay in the port of London 
was £1 10 shillings per month on the eve of war in 1793; it leapt immediately to £3 15 
shillings upon the outbreak of hostilities, and stood at over £5 in 1804. There was al-
ways the lure of prize money to motivate Navy crews. Non-rated seamen and mariners 
stood to divide ¼ of the condemned value, while the captain took another ¼. But for 
crews of large ships, the prospects of such remained slim. It remained more than any-
thing else an enticement trick to maintain the appeal of service in the frigates and 
sloops. 
We might also observe that the navy’s campaign against piracy was a short, rapid 
and localised one: the campaign was already winding down by 1725, and seems to have  
largely ignored freebooting going on in the South Seas (the voyages of William Dampi-
er, for example). Much of the disciplinary legislation, such as the Articles of War passed 
as a statute by Parliament in 1749, and which considered serious infractions and their 
punishment in court-martial trials, were subsequent to the great offensive against piracy 
early in the century.131 Scholars like Janice Thompson prefer to situate ‘the more defini-
tive reordering in global efforts to control mercenaries, pirates and other non-state vio-
lent actors to the ‘long nineteenth century’.132  
Nevertheless, as a rhetorical front, the British Navy tried to spread its message 
amongst other European nations as their national navies came together after the Treaty 
of Utrecht (March / April 1713). It reminded them that the law made clear that pirates 
were a ‘common enemy’, which every nation that could defend itself had a duty to fight. 
It will be interesting to study contemporary French reactions to this propaganda.133 In 
some places, the Royal Navy went so far as instituting localised ‘regime change’. Car-
ibbean neighbours like the rogue governor Adolf Esmit of Danish St. Thomas in the 
Virgin islands, who was himself a former pirate, was, for example, ousted in October 
1684.134 
                                                 
131  For a discussion, see Greg Dening, Mr. Bligh’s Bad Language: Passion, Power and Theatre on the Bounty, Cam-
bridge: 1992, 147-50. 
132  J. Thompson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern 
Europe, Princeton U.P.: 1994. 
133  Schaeper disappointingly concentrates on the trading tariffs controversy, but covers two French ‘spies’ sent to 
London to cover parliamentary discussion and newspaper coverage of the debate, ‘French and English trade after 
the Treaty of Utrecht: the missions of Anisson and Fénellon’, in British Journal for 18th Century Studies, 9, 1986, 
pp. 1-18. 
134  Waldemar Westergaard, The Danish West Indies under Company Rule (1671 - 1754) (MacMillan, New York, 
1917). 
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(2) What kind of national economic backdrop? 
A third front I would like to open in blazing new trails across the topic focuses on rejig-
ging old interpretations that the first half of the eighteenth century – especially the dec-
ades 1720-40 - was a period of economic stagnation. This idea has been discarded, es-
pecially in the sense that the importance of foreign trade seems to have been greater 
than is suggested by official statistics.135 The fight against piracy was spearheaded dur-
ing a period of long, sustained national economic growth, hence to the background of a 
rise in national income and the increase in the mercantile marine, so that the logic and 
necessity of the fight against piracy becomes clearer, as do the resources at the British 
government’s disposal.136 
Figure 5: Exports of total manufactures from England 
 
Source: Walter Minchinton, The growth of English overseas trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Lon-
don: Methuen, 1969, 108. 
However, while piracy was effectively targeted by the state, other maritime problems 
like armed bands of smugglers were allowed to mushroom, reaching a peak in the 1730s 
                                                 
135  A.H. John, ‘Aspects of English Economic Growth in the first half of the Eighteenth Century’, reprod. in Minchin-
ton, The growth of English overseas trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, London: Methuen, 1969, 
183; K. Berrill, ‘International trade and the rate of economic growth’, Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol. 
XII, 1960, p.358. 
136  Richard Middleton, Naval administration in the age of Pitt and Anson, 1755-63. 
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and 1740s with the Hawkhurst gang.137 The situation in George II’s reign (1727-60) has 
been described as one of a ‘systematic and permanent traffic in contraband, sympa-
thized with by the bulk of the population of the maritime counties’.138 The East India 
Company was naturally the most vociferous voice to complain about smuggling, partic-
ularly given the indebtedness facing the company, and was correspondingly far less of a 
political problem to Pitt the Younger’s advisers, but smuggling was also much easier to 
resolve from Westminster than piracy ; the removal of duties via the Commutation Act 
of 1784 from 119% to 12.5% largely did away with the need for smuggling, although as 
a practice it continued through to the nineteenth century. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For any discussion of the state’s provision of legal certainty to commerce, questions 
revolving around the suppression of piracy must necessarily come to the fore. Recent 
work on piracy has tended to concentrate on motivational issues and the culture of pirate 
communities, whether they were anarchies or authoritarian regimes.139 
In this (book) paper, I have adopted a historical, empirical approach that focuses on 
the agency of sub-state groups, especially the British Royal Navy, in the war against 
Caribbean piracy between 1680-1725, with an eye to nuancing arguments previously 
centred on the extension of state power. The Navy operated according to its own, inde-
pendent institutional logic, although many of the platforms it used ran in parallel to oth-
er state ones. The court-martial system, for example, ran alongside the continued appli-
cation of civil law courts. I would also like to reiterate here that the suppression of pira-
cy is a historical contingency, and not in any ways an irrevocable process, as the recent 
upsurge in kidnappings and maritime piracy off Somalia and in the southern Philippines 
demonstrate. 
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